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I. Introduction 
 a. Historical Background  
 On November 9, 1989, a new era of German history began when East German 
official Günter Schabowski announced that citizens of the German Democratic Republic, 
or East Germany, could now visit West Germany and West Berlin. After more than 
twenty-six years of partition that had begun in August 1961, the fall of the Berlin Wall 
represented major political, economic, and cultural shifts for the nation. According to 
Hans Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, or West 
Germany, at the time of Reunification, “The will of the people prevailed over the old 
rule. Yet this revolution was taking place without violence, without bloodshed. This 
phenomenon is specifically what remains the accomplishment of people in East 
Germany. They have enriched all Germans” (Genscher 1995:291). 
 On October 3, 1990, German unity was established as the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) ceased to exist and was assimilated into the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). The Federal Republic gained full sovereignty over the formerly-
socialist occupied territories, and its laws replaced those of the former GDR with the 
government now under the authority of the Federal Republic (Turner 1992: 252). 
Germany was officially unified once again. 
 Yet, the economic upheaval caused by German Reunification also caused many 
ripples through society. Merging a booming capitalist economy and a faltering socialist 
system presented numerous challenges, but also increased opportunity for foreign 
investment and production capabilities. As Shawn Tully wrote for Fortune Magazine in 
1990 following Reunification, “In the long term, the economic payoff ought to be 
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enormous. Western capital and expertise combined with East Germany’s skilled, 
inexpensive work force should result in a thriving West German-style industrial base and 
a consumer market stretching from the Elbe to the Baltic” (Tully 1990: 21).  
While this optimistic view does not portray the economic realities of the 1990s in 
an entirely accurate manner, Reunification undoubtedly provided new opportunities for 
business development and entrepreneurship. As the Eastern Ostmark currency was 
absorbed into the Western Deutschmark in a 1-to-1 ratio despite its drastically lower 
value, a policy of investment and modernization was pursued throughout the nation and 
especially in the former Eastern territories. As cultural perceptions and human capital 
began to change in the reunified Germany, so did employment decisions, including those 
surrounding business creation and entrepreneurship.  
 b. Topic Introduction and Hypotheses 
This paper will seek to determine the effects of social and human capital on 
entrepreneurial activity in Germany from 1986 to the present, using self-employment 
variables as empirical proxy measures for entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activity. 
This research was initially motivated by informal conversations in the summer of 2012 
with Dr. Dorothea Schäfer at the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (or DIW 
Berlin, The German Institute for Economic Research) and Dr. Ulrich Kohler at 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (or WZB, The Social Science Research 
Center of Berlin).  
At DIW and WZB, I informally began my personal inquiries into the 
socioeconomic transitions of Germany in the post-Reunification period. As a society and 
economy, Germany has undergone revolutionary transitions for much of the twentieth 
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and twenty-first centuries, with some of the greatest transformations coming in the past 
thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With Germany serving as one of the key 
players in mitigating the effects of the Eurozone Crisis, it is useful to determine how the 
nation rose to this point of prominence following the difficulty of merging capitalist and 
socialist economies in the early 1990s. Dr. Schäfer highlighted the 2006 FIFA World Cup 
hosted in Germany, which coincided with a renewed global focus on German growth and 
policy. Since then, she classifies Germany’s stable growth, politics of austerity, and 
comparatively stable output following the global financial crisis as reasons for 
Germany’s rise to prominence in the twenty-first century.1 
Furthermore, Dr. Kohler elaborated upon the German welfare state, as well as 
education and immigration policies, to discuss differences between the American and 
German systems. He highlighted specific initiatives designed to mitigate spikes in 
unemployment and layoffs with a type of government-sponsored “wage insurance” for 
businesses. Additionally, he highlighted the welfare system as an important facet of 
support for groups such as single parents, the elderly, and the ill.2 Despite Germany’s 
successes, shortcomings such as immigrant integration, particularly within Turkish 
communities, and modernization of educational standards require continued improvement 
for further socioeconomic development. 
The case of post-Reunification Germany is a fitting environment in which to 
study entrepreneurship, as the fall of the Berlin Wall led to an unanticipated, large-scale 
restructuring of a diverse society. Subsequent Reunification of Germany less than one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Information	  provided	  based	  on	  informal	  discussions	  with	  Dr.	  Dorothea	  Schäfer	  at	  DIW	  Berlin,	  July	  2012.	  2	  Information	  provided	  based	  on	  informal	  discussions	  with	  Dr.	  Ulrich	  Kohler	  at	  WZB	  Berlin,	  July	  2012	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year later required a shift to a combined market economy of the former East and West. 
This research therefore will synthesize how this event and subsequent adaptations and 
societal changes have molded entrepreneurial tendencies, with a particular focus on the 
social and cultural characteristics of individuals. Discussions of capitalist Western and 
socialist Eastern economic integration will demonstrate how individuals’ characteristics, 
educations, social ties, personality traits, and backgrounds differed, as well as how they 
have changed over time. 
Drawing on previous inquiries into entrepreneurship in Germany and former-
socialist nations, my hypotheses are that entrepreneurs in Germany are more likely to be 
male, between the ages of 25 and 45, and unemployed in recent years. I then expect the 
importance of social ties to cause a great deal of variation in individuals’ self-
employment propensity. Additional dimensions of social and human capital will likely 
play a role in self-employment and entrepreneurial activity. I expect those households 
and individuals with social ties to other parts of Germany to have a higher probability of 
self-employment and entrepreneurship due to their increase in social capital, and I also 
predict that categories such as job history, parental occupation and relationships, and 
personality characteristics, such as political leanings or risk aversion, will also impact 
these employment decisions. 
 
II. Literature Review  
The underlying socioeconomic basis for my research question comes from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conception of the three forms of capital. Bourdieu (1983) separates capital 
into the economic, social, and cultural dimensions, all of which require time expenditures 
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to accumulate and have the capability to produce profits once amassed. Economic capital 
is that which is directly convertible to money and can be institutionalized as property 
rights, but additional differentiation can be drawn from the accumulation of cultural and 
social capital. Cultural capital includes the embodied state, defined as dispositions of the 
mind and body, as well as access to objectified cultural items (i.e. books, instruments) 
and the effects of associated institutions (i.e. universities, employers). Cultural capital is 
generally linked to family and upbringing, and can explain inequalities in academic 
achievement by children from various socioeconomic strata (Bourdieu 1983: 241-243).  
Furthermore, Bourdieu defines social capital as the “aggregate of actual or 
potential resources which are linked to a durable [and institutionalized] network… which 
provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital.” 
Examples of social capital include various credentials such as degrees, titles, family 
name, or affiliation with a socioeconomic class, all of which determine an individual’s 
social standing and the impact, legitimacy, and support for his or her undertakings (248-
250). Social capital therefore has important implications for entrepreneurial tendencies, 
as it can determine one’s network, mentorship, and investment opportunities.  
Glaeser et al. (2002) describe accumulations of social capital as consistent with 
standard economic investment models, with investment and accumulation decreasing 
with age, physical distance from networks, travel costs, and greater mobility, the later of 
which decreases investment because of a more transient social structure. Investment and 
accumulation contrastingly increase with certain occupation types, homeownership (and 
therefore lowered mobility), and ease of communication. Glaeser et al. highlight the 
nuanced and specific conditions that impact an individual’s social capital accumulation. 
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In particular, a study in Germany by Knies (2009) references the investment model of 
social capital, describing that residential mobility has caused the biggest decline in 
neighborhood social ties. He also cites a unique cultural norm in Germany that causes 
one to keep their neighbors distant and avoid close contact when possible. Despite 
improved communication technologies, this finding holds important implications for the 
future of entrepreneurship because it calls into question how virtual ties will mitigate the 
loss of residential neighborhood ties, as well as what role the internet will play in future 
development.  
This investment model of social capital, along with Jackson et al.’s (2012) 
findings on the importance of social capital for structuring and enforcing behaviors 
within a network, indicate that accumulation of social capital is an important determinant 
of these employment choices. As Jackson et al. assert, support is a characteristic of 
networks that “emphasizes social structure’s role in the enforcement of behavior” (1889). 
Rauch (1999) also applies this theory of networks to international trade, discussing how a 
networked view of international trade adds important considerations of “personal contacts 
and relationship-building in determining the geographic distribution of economic 
activity” (33). 
 Researchers have begun to apply such theories of social capital and networks to 
the cases of partitioned and reunified Germany to determine how social connections 
influenced development policy and income trends. Redding and Sturm (2008), for 
example, evaluate the costs of geographic remoteness following the establishment of the 
permanent border between East and West Germany. After controlling for the level of 
wartime destruction in West German border cities, their findings indicate that cities in 
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close geographic proximity to the newly constructed border saw a decrease in population. 
This effect was especially pronounced in smaller cities and was shown to be causally 
linked to a loss of market access and the spatial distribution of economic activity, 
demonstrating the cost of remoteness (1794).  
Hunt (2006) continues the discussion of migration, focusing on wages and 
unemployment as reasons for East to West migration in the Germany-specific case. She 
describes that the huge wage increases in the East from 1991 to 1994 explain half of the 
migration decreases from the East for that time period, and they explain 85 percent of the 
migration decreases for the young. Nevertheless, subsequent stagnation of Eastern wages 
in comparison to Western wages sparked increased emigration flows. Overall, she finds 
that young college graduates are five times as likely to emigrate in comparison to others 
in their age cohort, showing that determinants of social capital and economic mobility 
depend on age, education level, and the strength of ties.  Additionally, Melzer and 
Muffles (2012) use reunification as a “natural experiment” in which to analyze changes 
in subjective well-being (SWB) for those moving from Eastern to Western Germany after 
1989. Those migrating from East Germany started with lower levels of SWB, which did 
improve after migrating to the West. Yet they generally remained less satisfied in 
comparison to Western Germans who did not migrate. Such characteristics of migrations 
and displacements therefore have further impact on employment and entrepreneurial 
attitudes. 
Perhaps most critical for the development of this paper’s research question is a 
recent study by Burchardi and Hassan (2013) concerning entrepreneurship and social 
capital. Burchardi and Hassan test their hypothesis that West Germans with social ties to 
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the East had a comparative advantage following Reunification because of their 
connections allowed them to capitalize on the new eastern sector of the economy. Using a 
model constructed from the G-SOEP data set (see Methodology section for further 
details), they demonstrated that West German households with ties to East Germany, in 
comparison to those with no similar ties, saw on average a 6.7 percentage point increase 
in income growth in the six-year period following German reunification. A caveat to this 
finding was that the income of entrepreneurs with ties to the East rose by four times as 
much as that of non-entrepreneurs in the same time period (1260-1267). Therefore, while 
Burchardi and Hassan demonstrate the importance of social ties for economic prosperity, 
they also show that this social capital is of even greater importance for entrepreneurs, 
supporting the hypothesis that personality traits and socialization of individuals will 
impact their entrepreneurial tendencies. 
 Entrepreneurship itself has been a much-studied institution globally and in post-
Socialist Eastern Europe, with a large literature focusing on how development and self-
employment trends have played out since the fall of the Iron Curtain. In analyzing the 
characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs in general, Delmar and Davidsson (2000) 
compare the American and Nordic economies to analyze how economic systems affect 
entrepreneurial attitudes. They find that entrepreneurs are less prevalent in Sweden than 
the US, citing factors such as size and industry composition of the private sector, wage 
dispersion, taxation, and welfare as potential reasons for these differences. Interestingly, 
they also found differences between entrepreneurial attitudes in Sweden and Norway, and 
cited differences in the business-size distribution in the countries as a potential cause. 
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Their study demonstrates the importance of the surrounding social, economic, and firm 
structures for the development of entrepreneurial attitudes.  
 In an empirical analysis of entrepreneurship in the United States, Evans and 
Leighton (1989) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and the Current 
Population Surveys to report a number of key findings about entrepreneurial 
determinants. They find that the probability of departing from self-employment decreases 
with the duration of self-employment (i.e. those self-employed for longer periods are less 
likely to leave self-employment), the fraction of the labor force who is self-employed 
increases until age 40 and then remains constant until the retirement years, and those who 
switch to self-employment are more likely to be males, have greater assets, be poorer 
wage workers, and have an internal locus of control. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) 
also highlight financial and liquidity constraints faced by American entrepreneurs, 
showing that inheritances greatly increase the chances of engaging in entrepreneurial 
activity. Their study also shows that many individuals in industrialized nations report that 
they would rather be self-employed, and self-employed individuals are often more 
satisfied. But many cite shortage of capital and money as a reason for not making a 
switch to self-employment. Capital access, labor market experience, and personality traits 
have thus been established as general factors that determine the self-employment 
decision.  
Another American study by Fairlie and Robb (2007) highlights important human 
capital dimensions in determining entrepreneurial tendencies and small business venture 
success. Using data from the Characteristics of Business Owners Survey, they found that 
more than half of business owners had a self-employed family member, and they 
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conclude that similarities across family members in entrepreneurial preferences may 
explain part of this relationship. If family members in fact influence human capital 
development and self-employment tendencies, this could be noteworthy in the German 
case. Particularly, Fairlie and Robb find that having worked in a family member’s 
business has large, positive, and statistically significant effects on business success 
metrics. In the case of the German Democratic Republic under socialist rule, an entire 
generation of potential entrepreneurs would not have had access to such opportunities, 
which could be reflected in the successes of their business ventures after Reunification.  
Caliendo et al. (2009) expand on this body of entrepreneurship literature that 
studies American markets and look at personality factors of the entrepreneurial decision 
by using the SOEP data panel. They investigate how risk attitudes affect the decision to 
become self-employed, demonstrating that those with lower risk aversion have a 
significantly higher entrepreneurial probability. Interestingly, they find that this 
relationship holds only for those active in the labor force at the time of the survey, with 
no significant impact of risk attitudes on the entrepreneurship decisions of unemployed or 
inactive persons.   
This indicates that previous labor market status is an important indicator of 
transitions to self-employment, and also expands on previous research as it finds that risk 
attitudes are not necessarily an individual trait constant throughout life. As Tyson et al. 
(1994) explain, many in former Socialist states lacked experiential business knowledge, 
social motivations for entrepreneurship, and a sense of trust in the shifting economic 
system. In order for governments and firms to successfully promote entrepreneurship in 
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post-Socialist cultures, they must understand the increased complexity of labor division 
and the management techniques needed to mitigate it.  
 Focusing in on East Germany and the potential ramifications of nearly half a 
century of Soviet rule, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) analyze the effects of 
Communism on individuals’ preferences, also using G-SOEP data. Their regression 
analyses show that the differences in preferences between former East and West 
Germany with respect to migration, transfer programs, and government involvement are 
largely attributed to direct effects of Communism. The question therefore becomes how 
to promote new social programming in East Germany, which would stimulate 
entrepreneurship and labor market innovation. Indigenous Endogenous Institutions, 
defined by Botteke et al. (2008) as those designed by individual agents pursuing their 
own ends without influence by governments or entities exogenous from the market, 
demonstrate the most potential for sustainable development programs.  This stresses the 
importance of development programs that are created by those whom they will serve, 
which shows the potential effectiveness of entrepreneurship and start-ups for meeting 
societal needs. 
 Based on the large body of literature that analyzes the importance of surrounding 
social and economic characteristics on entrepreneurial attitudes, there is valid support that 
nascent entrepreneurial activity on the eve of economic transition (i.e. 1989-1990 in the 
former East) had a positive effect on startup activity after the introduction of the market 
economy, as described by Wyrwich (2012). He defines an entrepreneurial heritage as “a 
legacy of industrial and regional culture that favors self-employment,” and shows that 
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such entrepreneurial heritage is a regional characteristic that influences startup activity, 
even in a transitional context (441).  
In the German context, it has been demonstrated that new business formation has 
more of an impact on employment growth in areas with a higher density of economic 
activity, and that region-specific knowledge capital and spillovers impact the 
characteristics of regional innovation (Fritsch and Mueller 2008; Fritsch 2004). After the 
fall of the GDR, Fritsch and Ruskova (2012) explain, East Germans have shown reluctant 
attitudes towards self-employment. They explain that socialist propaganda had a negative 
effect on the transfer of entrepreneurial attitudes between generations for East Germans, 
especially for those highly educated in the GDR system.  This parental disruption of role 
models within the former GDR can likely explain why self-employment levels in former 
Eastern states only equalized with Western states fifteen years after Reunification.  
Runst (2011) echoes similar ideas about transmission of entrepreneurial attitudes 
in a post-Socialist culture, discussing how individuals in planned economies develop 
certain beliefs and preferences. While attempting to explain the gap in self-employment 
in former Eastern and Western states after Reunification, Runst argues that “traditional” 
determinants of self-employment (i.e. credit constraints, human capital, adverse 
selection) cannot fully explain the east-west gap. He asserts that the unique socialist 
history of East Germany was another factor that influenced self-employment rates and 
entrepreneurial attitudes.  
 In the 2012 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) country report for Germany, 
Sternberg et al. (2013) report that 5.3 percent of adult Germans were either nascent 
entrepreneurs or owners or managers of young businesses, defined as those no more than 
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three and a half years old. Gender disparities in entrepreneurship that have been reported 
in other nations are also seen in Germany, with a Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) rate at 7.2 percent for German men but only 3.5 percent for German 
women.3 While the rate for men has been rising constantly since 2008, the rate for 
women has stagnated. German entrepreneurs are more likely to cite the desire to pursue a 
business idea (4.1 percent) than the lack of alternative employment (1.2 percent) as the 
reason for a transition to self-employment. Furthermore, German entrepreneurs often 
have social connections to other entrepreneurs, live in high-income households, launch 
businesses to exploit market opportunities, and concentrate their endeavors in the high-
tech sector. Overall, the view of the entrepreneurial scene in Germany, as conveyed by 
the GEM, is positive. 35 percent of the interviewees stated that they saw good 
opportunities for entrepreneurship. However, only 37 percent believe they would have 
the necessary skills and experience to launch a business, highlighting a discrepancy 
between the opportunities and training or education.  
 An additional GEM report by Brixy et al. (2013) discusses business startups by 
migrants in Germany.4 While migrants are often assumed to be less risk-averse and more 
self-assertive because of their decision to move and begin a new life and career, this is 
not the case in the German migrant sample. Germans in the GEM survey showed a 
pronounced fear of failure when setting up a business that is starker than in other 
countries. But immigrants to Germany have just as high of risk-aversion as the local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor by Sternberg et al. (2013) defines the Total Early-stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rate as the “rate of individuals in the working age population who are 
actively involved in business start-ups, either in the phase in advance of the birth of the firm (i.e., the 
payment of any wages for more than three months) or the phase spanning 42 months after the birth of the 
firm.” 
4 The GEM IAB by Brixy et al. (2013) defines migrants as those “who state they were not born in the 
country in which the survey was carried out. … Foreign citizens who were born in the country where the 
survey is taking place with are dealt with as nationals.”  
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population, especially if they are not experienced in dealing with German administrative 
procedures which can be difficult for migrants. Migrants to Germany are less likely to 
think they have the necessary knowledge for starting a business, and specific trades often 
require qualifications which are difficult to obtain outside of Germany, putting migrants 
at a comparative disadvantage.  
In general, Brixy et al. (2013) find that migrants are only approximately one 
percentage point more likely to start a business than the local Germans. Both migrants 
and locals with university educations are more likely to start businesses. Overall, this 
report shows the importance of migrants who present themselves as entrepreneurs (as 
opposed to dependent employees) and who can therefore make important economic 
development contributions to Germany. The authors view migrant entrepreneurship in 
Germany as a way to use skills and knowledge that are not generally recognized or 
sought out in Germany. Such a paradigm shift could create new employment 
opportunities for future migrants. 
 In addition to the GEM reports, numerous authors have also evaluated the state of 
contemporary entrepreneurship in Germany.  Bergmann and Sternberg (2007) use data 
from previous waves of the GEM survey to discuss the changes in entrepreneurial 
activity and attitudes in the early twenty-first century. They find that as regional 
unemployment increases, entrepreneurial propensity does as well. German nascent 
entrepreneurs are classified as “opportunity” and “necessity” entrepreneurs. While 
opportunity entrepreneurs generally fit the standard theoretical models of 
entrepreneurship determination (discussed previously in detail), necessity entrepreneurs 
launch businesses independently of age, gender, education, and regional influences. The 
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increase in necessity entrepreneurs may increase awareness and enthusiasm for startups 
in Germany, and the authors highlight that policies designed to generate startup activities 
are most effective in regions with rising unemployment. 
 Additionally, Joachim Wagner (2007) analyzes the gender gap in entrepreneurial 
activity in Germany, and his empirical model finds that fear of failure may be an 
important gender-specific determinant, as 56 percent of women but only 44 percent of 
men cite fear of failure as a reason to not become self-employed. Such a model based on 
risk-aversion differentials between genders presents other sociological and biological 
considerations in the decision to become self-employed. Fossen and Rostam-Afschar 
(2013) analyze precautionary and entrepreneurial savings in Germany. After controlling 
for entrepreneurship, they find that no significant estimates of precautionary savings 
remain, indicating that the difference in saving between entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial households is very different in countries like Germany with extensive 
social security systems. Since they will not receive state pension insurance and welfare, 
entrepreneurs must plan in order to save individually.  
 
III. Methodology 
 a. The German Socioeconomic Panel (G-SOEP, or SOEP) 
The data used for the empirical section of this research project is the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (G-SOEP, or SOEP). This panel is maintained and distributed by 
DIW Berlin, and access rights to the data set have been acquired with assistance from 
Professor Christopher Baum after submitting a brief research proposal to DIW in April 
2013. 
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 The G-SOEP data set is a panel survey data set, first collected in 1984. It is 
similar to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the United States, in the sense 
that the SOEP is centered on the question of well-being over the course of individual and 
household lives. Both quantitative and qualitative psychological data are included in the 
SOEP to explain subjective ideas of well-being (often through income and life 
satisfaction variables), and it is used by many disciplines in the social sciences to better 
understand utility, ability, and personality traits.  
The SOEP is generally regarded to capture intergenerational relationships, as the 
same households are surveyed in each wave of the SOEP to look at continuities and 
changes over time. Additionally, all members of the household age 17 or older are 
surveyed, meaning perspectives other than just that of the household head are conveyed 
in the panel. It contains information about networks, neighborhood, and environment, all 
of which are critical to this particular study. This provides information about 
“environmental embeddedness of behavior” and social capital. Furthermore, the SOEP 
has given high priority to oversampling immigrant populations with a subset of recent 
immigrants. The survey territory was expanded to the former German Democratic 
Republic in 1990 following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and a subsample of high-
income households was introduced in 2002 to mitigate the issue of selection bias away 
from high-income households.5 
 b. Empirical Methodology 
 All data used in the empirical analyses of this paper are taken from the 1984 to 
2011 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel. Using the SOEPinfo program, one is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  All descriptions of the German Socioeconomic Panel used in this study are adapted from Wagner et al. 
(2007)’s description and analysis of the G-SOEP data set.	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able to browse through directories of all variables contained in the SOEP to determine 
their location in the data set directories and the years in which the information was 
collected.6 Each basket created in the SOEPinfo database holds up to 500 variables, and 
the program automatically generates Stata code developed by Dr. Jan Goebel of DIW 
Berlin to pull selected variables from their directories and merge them into a .dta file. For 
this paper, two variable baskets were combined by manually assembling Dr. Goebel’s 
code and merging them with several “meta” variables whose directories were not 
accessible with the SOEPinfo codes and therefore needed to be included manually. 
Following the creation of the master .dta file for this paper, variables were tabulated and 
analyzed in Stata to identify basic trends and ideas. 
 Due to the nature of the survey data of the SOEP, continuous time series analysis 
is made difficult by survey methodology. Because new respondents are added to the 
participant pool each year, and because the questions asked in the survey vary depending 
on year and are not continuous throughout its 27-year history, six individual years were 
chosen for analysis. The first year included in the analysis is 1986, giving a perspective 
from partitioned West Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall or Reunification. Data 
are then analyzed every five years. This analysis thus includes data from 1991, 1996, 
2001, 2006, and 2011. All variables were recoded in Stata to remove missing values and 
make labels suitable for regression analysis. Probit regressions were run using self-
employment as a dependent variable acting as a proxy for entrepreneurship (See Tables 1 
through 6 in the Data Appendix). Due to sample size and missing value discrepancies 
between directories, regressions for each year were broken into categories including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  SOEPinfo is accessible online at http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2012/.	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employment, politics, social conditions, family characteristics, wages and income, and 
immigrant categories. Each regression, however, controlled for the effects of age, gender, 
nationality, and years of education or training. 
 
IV. Results 
a. Regression Results 
Tables 1 through 6 of the Data Appendix provide summary tabulations for the 
self-employment proxies, used as dependent variables in the probit regression models. 
These tables calculate the number of G-SOEP survey respondents who classify 
themselves as self-employed. The percentage of self-employed respondents ranges from 
4.05 percent in 1991 to 6.26 percent in 2006, with an average of 5.02 percent for the six 
years used in regression analyses. These tabulations align similarly with the statistics 
provided in the 2012 GEM by Sternberg et al. (2013), which state that 5.3 percent of 
adult Germans were either nascent entrepreneurs or owners or managers of young 
businesses. Overall, self-employment demonstrates a mild increasing trend since pre-
Reunification waves of the SOEP panel survey. 
Tables 7 through 12 of the Data Appendix describe the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables in the probit models for each year. The regression model results for 
the 1986 sample can be found in Table 7 of the Data Appendix. In all six models run for 
1986, age is shown to have a positive and significant marginal effect on self-employment 
status, but with a small magnitude, ranging from a 0.02 to 0.21 percent increase in self-
employment probability on average for each year of age. Gender is also shown to have a 
significant effect in many of the models, as females are shown to be 1.5 to 2.1 percent 
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less likely than males to be self-employed. Each additional year of formal education or 
training also increases an individual’s likelihood of self-employment by 0.13 to 0.95 
percent per additional year. While an individual’s age at the time of their first job is only 
significant at the 10 percent level (a decrease of 0.19 percent for each additional year of 
delayed first employment), the nature of their first employment is very important in 
determining their current labor status. Those who were self-employed in their first job are 
42.08 percent more likely on average to be self-employed in the 1986 survey period, and 
that result is significant at the 1 percent level.  
While political interests and strength of political party support did not 
demonstrate significant effects on self-employment in the 1986 survey period, specific 
parties supported did in fact have significant effects. In comparison to a base case of the 
SPD (Social Democratic Party), individuals who supported the CDU (Christian 
Democratic Union), FDP (Free Democratic Party), or Green Party were 7.13, 7.17, and 
2.43 percent more likely to be self-employed, respectively. These estimates are all 
significant at either the 1 or 5 percent levels. Furthermore, household income measures 
are also significant in estimating self-employment status in 1986. For each additional 
1000 marks of household post-government and asset flow income, an individual was 
estimated to be .04 and .05 percent more likely to be self-employed, respectively. In 
analyzing the immigrant subsample of the 1986 SOEP, sense of German nationality did 
not demonstrate significant effects on self-employment. However, those who self-
reported their German language skills as “good” or “very good” were on average 2.65 
and 5.31 percent more likely to be self-employed, respectively.  
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Continuing to the 1991 regression models described in Table 8 of the Data 
Appendix, variables for age, gender, and years of education or training demonstrate 
similar marginal effects on self-employment in 1991 as they did in 1986 (with similar 
statistical significances and magnitudes as well). Again, the nature of first employment is 
shown to be a significant predictor of self-employment, with those who were self-
employed in their first job being predicted as 33.56 percent more likely on average to be 
self-employed in 1991. Associations with the CDU and FDP again show positive and 
significant marginal effects on self-employment of 4.13 and 9.90 percent respectively 
when compared to SPD supporters. 
Many components of social capital included in the 1991 regression were shown 
not to be significant.7 However, several interesting predictions are discernable. Those 
who described their relationships with relatives to be “average” are 3.17 percent more 
likely on average to be self-employed (significant at the 5 percent level). Interestingly, 
those who knew close relations or coworkers who had moved to the West were 1.57 and 
2.57 percent less likely on average to be self-employed (significant at the 10 and 1 
percent levels respectively and based on the 1991 relative regression; similar trends and 
significances visible in the 1991 friend regression). Those who classified their 
relationships with friends as “average” or “close” were 3.02 and 3.11 percent more likely 
on average to be self-employed, respectively (significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels). 
Similar trends in household income measures are seen in 1991 as they were in 1986, 
though at smaller magnitudes in 1991. The immigrant subsample again displayed effects 
of German language skills, significant at the 5 percent level, stating those with “good” or 
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  Sample sizing issues may have also caused such effects.  
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“very good” German skills were 2.34 and 4.11 percent more likely on average to be self-
employed. 
 While similar trends are seen with age, gender, education, first job self-
employment, political party support, and household income in 1996 (with regression 
results in Table 9 of the Data Appendix), interesting new trends are depicted in the set of 
1996 regressions. Nationality becomes highly significant in four of the models run for 
1996, with those who are German-born having a 1.47 to 2.77 percent greater likelihood 
on average of being self-employed. All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. 
The 1996 models also show significant effects of work satisfaction and political interests. 
In terms of work satisfaction, those who classify themselves as “moderately” or “very” 
satisfied with work were 3.06 and 3.75 percent more likely to be self-employed on 
average, respectively. Additionally, those with “strong” or “very strong” political 
interests were also shown to be more likely to engage in self-employment (1.95 and 2.81 
percent, significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively). 
In the regression models run for 2001 (depicted in Table 10 of the Data 
Appendix), the controls of age, gender, nationality, education, and first job self-
employment all demonstrated similar predictive effects, magnitudes, and significances as 
they did in the models of the previous years. However, new variables that were surveyed 
in 2001 also added new information in this series of regressions. Age at first job was once 
again significant, with a 0.45 percent increase in self-employment on average for each 
year of delayed initial employment.  
New employment-related survey questions were added in these models. The first 
asked participants if they are allowed to decide how to complete tasks themselves while 
 23 
at work. Those who said such a statement “applies partially” or “applies completely” to 
their employment situation are 4.13 percent and 17.47 percent more likely on average to 
be self employed, and both estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. Also, those 
who said that learning something new often on the job “applies completely” to their 
employment experience are 4.73 percent more likely to be self-employed. In terms of 
political effects, those who classified their interests as “very strong” or supported the 
CDU, FDP, Alliance 90 or Greens were more likely than those supporting the SPD to be 
self-employed. Household income measures showed similar trends in 2001 as in earlier 
years, but wages showed a curiously opposing relationship. For each additional 1000 
euros earned, an individual was .29 percent less likely on average to be self-employed, 
significant at the 1 percent level. German language skills remain important for 
immigrants’ self-employment decisions. 
In 2006 (Described in Table 11 of the Data Appendix), age, gender, nationality, 
education, and first job self-employment remain important significant predictors. Work 
satisfaction estimates are significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, with those classifying 
themselves as “somewhat” “moderately” and “very” satisfied with work being 4.41, 4.30, 
and 5.25 percent more likely on average to be self-employed. “Strong” and “very strong” 
political interests showed similar effects in 2006 as they did in 2001, and while CDU, 
FDP, and Alliance90/Green supporters remained significantly more likely than SPD 
supporters to be self-employed, PDS and Republican supporters are significantly less 
likely than SPD supporters to be self-employed in the 2006 models. The 2006 
employment models also include information on risk aversion for the first time of the 
years in this analysis, and risk attitudes are shown to be significant predictors of self-
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employment. Those who classify their willingness to take risks as “high” or “very high” 
are 3.58 and 12.94 percent more likely on average to be self-employed, significant at the 
1 percent level. Wages show a trend of similar magnitude and significance in 2006 as 
they do in 2001. 
Controls of age, gender, nationality, and education have similar results in the final 
set of regressions for 2011, depicted in Table 12 of the Data Appendix. Interestingly, first 
job self-employment is no longer significant or of comparatively high magnitude in the 
2011 regressions. Also, unemployment status in the previous year is significant in these 
models for the first time in comparison to other years, with those who were registered 
unemployed in the previous year being 3.93 percent less likely to be self-employed on 
average, significant at the 5 percent level. Risk aversion is again an important predictor, 
with those who classify willingness to take risks as “very high” being predicted to be 8.15 
percent more likely to be self employed (significant at the 1 percent level).  
Work satisfaction is also important for those who are “somewhat” (8.30 percent 
more likely), “moderately” (7.71 percent more likely), and “very” (12.35 percent more 
likely) satisfied with their employment. Political interest and party predictions follow 
similar patterns as the regressions for previous years. In the 2011 social regression, the 
number of close friends was shown to be a significant predictor of self-employment at the 
1 percent level. Each additional close friend reported by a respondent increased their 
likelihood of self-employment by .06 percent on average. Also, the immigrant regression 
showed that those who wished to remain in Germany permanently were 3.43 percent less 
likely to be self-employed (significant at the 5 percent level). 
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b. Empirical Discussion 
The six years used as samples in these regression models lead to several 
interesting analytic premises about self-employment in Germany, both before and after 
Reunification. The positive and significant effect of age on self-employment suggests that 
older members of the labor force are more likely to be self-employed, but the small 
magnitudes of these estimates do not allow for detailed age analysis. In many models, 
females are shown to be significantly less likely to be self-employed, which is consistent 
with a great deal of general and German-specific entrepreneurship literature. The positive 
and significant estimates of large magnitude for the “First Job Self-Employed” variable 
also highlight the potential importance of priming labor experiences for self-employment, 
as those with initial experience in self-employment are more likely to remain self-
employed in earlier waves of the survey data. However, the estimate is no longer 
significant in the most recent models for 2011, perhaps indicating a changing profile of 
those who are choosing self-employment as a labor market opportunity and a decreasing 
importance of priming experiences. 
An individual’s education is significant in determining self-employment status, 
but the estimates for mother’s and father’s education do not give significant estimates, 
suggesting that parental educational levels do not correlate with their children’s self-
employment.  Additional information on parents’ employment status could have perhaps 
clarify the role of priming and familial social capital for self-employment. The strong 
relationships of several political party affiliations, which are often consistent through the 
six sample years used in this paper, argue that social capital coming from particular party 
affiliations or ideologies may be important for entrepreneurial endeavors. This hypothesis 
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could also be supported by the predictions of strength of political interests, which become 
significant in the models for later years. 
It is unfortunate for the social capital hypotheses that few of the social capital 
indicators in the 1991 regression are significant predictors of self-employment. However, 
it is interesting that those who are close with friends are more likely to be self-employed 
on average, perhaps indicating more expansive non-familial social networks of those who 
are self-employed, while those who know persons who moved to the West are generally 
less likely to be self-employed. This may indicate that they are not taking advantage of 
self-employment opportunities because they are already established in their employment. 
More detailed regression research would be necessary to investigate further. The living 
standard evaluations were also not shown to be significant in the 1991 models. One could 
argue that not enough time had passed since Reunification for this to show a pronounced 
effect in the regression models. 
Household income is often shown to be a significant predictor of self-
employment, which is also consistent with literature that discusses the difficulties of 
finding startup capital for those with lower income. It is also possible that self-employed 
individuals have higher incomes, other things equal. It is surprising that wages have a 
significant negative prediction on self-employment in later years of the regression 
analysis, perhaps indicating that those making higher wages are more established in their 
traditional labor market opportunities and therefore less likely to seek alternative forms of 
self-employment. Additional information in the 2001 models shows that those who are 
self-employed are more likely to have decision power in how to complete their tasks at 
work, and they are also more likely to learn new things often while at work. This is useful 
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evidence when considering personal preferences and fulfillment of goals in employment. 
Work satisfaction is also a positive and significant predictor of self-employment in the 
2006 and 2011 models, perhaps indicating a modern transition to more fulfilled and 
fruitful self-employed individuals.  
Willingness to take risks is often discussed in the literature as an important 
characteristic of entrepreneurs, and the regression analyses for 2006 and 2011 also 
provide evidence for this idea. Other important results in later waves of regression 
modeling include the fact that recent unemployment has a negative and significant 
predictive effect on self-employment in the 2011 models. A possible explanation may be 
that those who are unemployed do not have the appropriate skills to instead transition to 
self-employment. Furthermore, when looking at trends in the immigrant regressions, self-
assessed language skills are very important determinants of self-employment in the 
immigrant subsample, an expected result considering the necessity of immigrants in 
Germany to be familiar with the language in order to run a successful business venture. 
The 2011 models also show that those who wish to remain in Germany permanently are 
less likely to be self-employed, perhaps indicating that these individuals would rather 
assimilate to a more traditional labor market opportunity in their new country, as opposed 
to looking for alternative work options. 
 
V. Case Study: Contemporary Entrepreneurship in Berlin  
 a. Cultural, Social, and Entrepreneurial Transitions in Reunified Berlin 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent Reunification in 1990 brought 
about immense economic changes for Germany, as the faltering socialist system of the 
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German Democratic Republic was absorbed into the expanding capitalist economy of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to the economic adjustments in currency 
valuation, infrastructure, and regulations, German Reunification also brought profound 
cultural and social shifts to both East and West Germany, as a divided people came 
together once again in the attempt to establish a national identity. This quest for a 
reunified cultural and social identity was perhaps most pronounced in Berlin, the city 
where the former East and West truly converged, both geographically and culturally. 
Alongside this convergence came the challenge to create a new identity for the reunified 
Germany that also provided distinction and a trajectory for future growth. With its history 
of destruction, partition, and reconstruction, Berlin is an interesting locale in which to 
observe such transitions. 
The desire to capture both history and modernity in this new view of identity is 
discussed in further detail by Philip Broadbent (2008). “The obsessive preoccupation 
with history and cultural memory in Berlin takes on many forms,” he explains. “The city 
is a site of layered histories, each vying to be heard and rescued from oblivion. In Berlin, 
everyone stumbles over the paving stones of German history” (149). The German term 
Wende, continues Broadbent, means “a turn,” and it is often used to describe the turning 
point in German history caused by Reunification. But he insists that despite the turns and 
changes in the social, cultural, or economic trajectories of Germany, the past will always 
be present in Germany and Berlin in particular.  
As Jarausch (2012) explains, the difference in living standards between the GDR 
and FRG became immediately apparent as millions of East Berliners streamed over the 
border following the breach of the Wall and witnessed firsthand the economic stagnation 
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of the East German society. It was therefore in Berlin itself that the cries for unification 
strengthened under the guise of “we are one people.” Berlin’s role took on even greater 
significance in the reunified Germany when the capital was relocated from Bonn to 
Berlin. Jarausch continues that the term “Berlin Republic” is used in contrast to that of 
the former Federal Republic. This change in terminology depicts not only the geographic 
shift of the capital city, but a “new quality of political culture and the growth of 
international responsibilities” as well (334).   
Furthermore, as former East Germans adapted to an individualistic society in the 
reunified Germany, a new type of competition was created in which small business 
owners, civil servants, and urban professionals sought higher degrees of success. Former 
East Germans undoubtedly experienced comparative disadvantages in adapting to such 
social and cultural constructs. However, Jarausch argues that such discussion of “one 
state, two societies,” particularly in the case of Berlin, is overly simplistic and fails to 
acknowledge the transnational issues that arose on the German and international stages in 
the same time frame as Reunification. These globally-minded shifts, however, would 
come to play a greater role in shaping Berlin’s twenty-first century economy, particularly 
after its stagnation in the late 1990s and early 2000s (336; 338-339). 
The partitioned East Berlin, as described by White and Gutting (1998), was 
designed to show the power of the socialist regime and to serve as a center of working- 
class life. Alexanderplatz became a focal point of East German power, while historic 
landmarks on the famous Unter den Linden were destroyed in the post-War period. 
Contrastingly, West Berlin remained a provincial city after its partition; despite large city 
centers such as the Kurfürstendamm, West Berlin was isolated and had no access points 
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to the remainder of West Germany. The relative underdevelopment of both East and West 
Berlin during partition therefore paved the way for gentrification to occur as the city was 
once again reunified in the early 1990s. Prenzlauer Berg in former East Berlin, for 
example, was a hotbed of countercultural activity near the end of the socialist period. It 
has since become known for its gentrified housing stock, change in urban form and 
activities, and its role as an entrepreneurial hub of contemporary Berlin. 
Following Reunification, White and Gutting argue that housing standards 
remained worse in the former East Berlin when compared to the West. Yet both the East 
and West became home to large immigrant populations in the 1990s. West Berlin led this 
trend as its employers recruited migrant guest workers from Mediterranean countries, 
Yugoslavia, and Turkey, who largely began settling in the Kreuzberg, Wedding, and 
Schöneberg districts. East Berlin was slower to attract high numbers of migrant workers, 
yet it now is home to a large representation of Polish, Turkish, former Yugoslavian, and 
other Eastern European immigrants.  
White and Gutting believe that as government policy began to focus on urban 
renewal in the east, Prenzlauer Berg had many advantages for becoming a hotbed of 
redevelopment and eventual gentrification. This has increased its international prestige 
and made it a hub of business development and entrepreneurial activity in the twenty-first 
century. It is accessible and well-connected to other parts of the city via the U-Bahn, its 
housing stock was largely unaffected by Soviet reconstruction (therefore making it more 
aesthetically pleasing for redevelopment in the 1990s), and it was relatively “left alone” 
by the GDR regime.  The authors therefore assert that “Prenzlauer Berg already carried 
an image as a stylish district with the possibility of establishment of bohemian, 
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‘alternative,’ or ‘ecologically aware’ lifestyles, sometimes maintained by young people in 
well-paid employment, sometimes by self-employed craft workers” (White and Gutting 
1998: 222).  
While White and Gutting concur with Broadbent (2008) and Jarausch (2012) that 
history remains etched in Berlin despite its redevelopment, they also demonstrate how the 
economic and social shifts of urban renewal primed up-and-coming districts of Berlin for 
entrepreneurial attention on a global scale. Heebels and van Aalst (2010) highlight that 
contemporary Prenzlauer Berg is characterized by a young and highly-educated 
population, a high birth rate, and a small minority population, while Kreuzberg is notable 
for its large Turkish immigrant population and the development of social spaces (i.e. bars, 
clubs, restaurants) on the banks of the Spree River. Such environments adapted to 
become ideal for the local exchange, feedback, and cooperation that are critical for the 
success of cultural entrepreneurship. Pécoud (2002) expands upon the idea of Turkish 
entrepreneurship in Berlin, critiquing that a regard of multiculturalism in 
entrepreneurship contradicts itself because “it promotes a vision of society in which 
relations between groups are determined and dominated by economic concerns” (Pécoud 
2002: 505). Indeed, integration of Turkish immigrant populations into the economic and 
cultural spaces of Berlin remains a challenge for policymakers, business owners, and 
residents alike.  
Cochrane and Passmore (2001) also describe Berlin’s “Euroconvergence,” or its 
“assimilation into the political-economic network of European cities,” as a reason for 
increased international regard and business development in the German capital (Cochrane 
and Passmore 2001: 347).  They assert that Berlin in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
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assimilated into this Western European network to create international business platforms 
for Europe and later for the global community. As a gateway to Eastern Europe, the 
authors propose that Berlin holds an important geographic and cultural location as 
economic activity expands beyond the traditional Western European powers and into the 
reconstructed and innovative Eastern European nations.  
With the modernization of Potsdamer Platz as a business hub of Berlin, alongside 
modern architectural contributions from famed designers Renzo Piano and Richard 
Rogers, the Berlin of the early 2000s represented a break from tradition and a goal of 
innovation within a more globalized network. Cochrane and Passmore insist on viewing 
cities as “complex and differentiated ‘ensembles’ made up of the informal as well as 
formal relationships and the conventions that exist between agencies (people, 
organizations, interests) which underpin their economic organization” (351). In this 
regard, Berlin was able to capitalize on its reentry into the European political-economic 
network to leverage elements of its culture as an entrepreneurial hub in the new 
millennium. 
As Liat Clark wrote in 2012, several years after the height of uncertainty in the 
Eurozone crisis, many young Europeans flocked to the countercultural center of Berlin, a 
“city where entrepreneurship is second nature, in a country that is one of the most 
politically and financially stable on the continent” (59). A growing body of 
socioeconomic literature considers this fusion of creative culture and relative economic 
stability as foundations of Berlin’s growing startup scene. These so-called 
“culturepreneurs,” as discussed by Lange (2011), initially focused on startups in fashion, 
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design, and music, which used aspects of space in Berlin to drive their business 
organizations, cultures, and social networking.  
Being a true Berliner, argues Lange, soon came to mean accepting a disparate 
urban context filled with old, new, and migrant workers, many of whom had fallen on 
economic hardships with the stagnation and global downturn. Berlin was portrayed as a 
countercultural island that needed to be understood and conquered in order to succeed, 
and these “Berlin mentalities” stressed neoliberal and flexible labor market opportunities 
in times of economic downturn.8 Such neoliberal ideas in the context of a modernizing 
city space therefore prompted cultural self-assertion, sites for new cultural projects, and a 
growing entrepreneurial spirit in the city (271). The ideas of “scene knowledge,” or 
familiarity with and networking within a particular socio-spatial enclave, became 
important for the success and proliferation of culturepreneurs’ ideas. Space and place, 
therefore, were crucial in creating the identity of a cultural entrepreneur.  
Heebels and van Aalst (2010) further develop this idea of space and networking in 
entrepreneurship with their discussion of “creative clusters” in areas such as Prenzlauer 
Berg and Kreuzberg. These local networks improved the flow of information and ideas, 
and could reduce transportation or transaction costs in the marketplace. Geographically, 
the open space in Berlin coupled with vague urban planning allowed the post-
Reunification landscape to develop alternative movements and cultural initiatives, 
including non-commercial creative scenes (i.e. music, literature) and creative industry. 
Creative entrepreneurs of this era cite Berlin’s tolerant and dynamic atmosphere, as well 
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as low rent and living costs, as reasons for the establishment of their ventures in such a 
locale.  
Overall, the authors conclude that Berlin culturepreneurs are now searching for an 
authenticity of place that cannot be created with policies for urban renewal. Instead, 
places such as clubs, bars, and cafes become critical for this group as they look to 
exchange ideas or meet “cultural gatekeepers” who have direct practical experience with 
the cultural startup scene. Despite the positive effects of networking on 
culturepreneurship in Berlin, Hausmann (2010) offers a more critical perspective of the 
difficulty that comes when intersecting cultural entrepreneurship and successful business 
management. Using the example of musicians, she asserts that musicians must be aware 
of sponsorship, funding, and business management opportunities in order to manage risk 
and ensure the long-term survival of artistic or cultural endeavors.  
As these authors illustrate, Berlin’s entrepreneurial roots were founded in its 
countercultural image in the years following reunification, which prompted artists and so-
called culturepreneurs to take advantage of the dynamism, openness, and creative 
clustering and networking in the city to pursue artistic endeavors. Yet contemporary 
Berlin is notably transitioning away from the purely cultural basis of entrepreneurship to 
what Clark (2012) calls “the city’s second wave of creativity,” or its booming growth of 
technology startups (59). Berlin is now being compared to Silicon Valley in terms of the 
scale of its IT startup growth, and governmental policies are being implemented to 
encourage both German and international entrepreneurs to settle in Berlin to create the 
next big application, social network, or operating system. Venture capital is beginning to 
flow into the city, and the counterculture that led artists to pursue the “bohemian” 
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lifestyle in Berlin is now prompting technology entrepreneurs to seek opportunity in an 
increasingly modern and international city. “Silicon Allee,” as it is known, has hopes of 
further stimulating the German economy and encouraging technological innovation in the 
capital city.  
Furthermore, Schmude et al. (2008) describe how entrepreneurship research and 
education in Germany is becoming very interdisciplinary, including synthesis with 
sociology, economics, and economic geography. The students graduating from 
Germany’s technical universities are often internationally-minded, further opening up 
Berlin’s startup scene to global involvement and internationalization of research and 
development. The authors also discuss their reservations about the internationalization of 
entrepreneurship in Germany, fearing that it could cause convergence of methods or 
topics, which would stifle its unique entrepreneurial innovation and research.  
An interesting facet of technology entrepreneurship development in Berlin is the 
cultural attitude towards risk. A willingness to take risks is necessary to initiate and scale 
businesses within the tech sector, and many have criticized Berlin’s entrepreneurs and 
investors for their conservative view of startup creation and financing. In her analysis of 
the dot-com era boom and bust in New York City’s “Silicon Alley,” Gina Neff (2012) 
argues that social processes determine how risks are framed, and social forces naturalize 
economic risk. Venture labor in the technology industry therefore requires that employees 
as well as entrepreneurs constantly update their skills and prepare for quick turnarounds.9 
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The labor process has become individualized, with rhetorical insistence on employees 
and entrepreneurs “buying into” the goals and ideals of the company.  
Neff continues that the dot-com boom saw young, energetic, new-economy 
entrepreneurs who were willing to take risks and have fun while making their money. 
Despite the bust of the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s, a lasting impact from this 
entrepreneurial era is the creation of technologies that seamlessly integrate into everyday 
life. The motivations of Silicon Alley have therefore crossed the Atlantic to Silicon Allee, 
as developers, programmers, and those with groundbreaking tech ideas look to integrate 
technological innovation into the everyday lives of users. 
According to Neff, Silicon Alley was motivated by young idealists who wanted to 
use technology to change media culture and economic trends in cultural production (152). 
This draws parallels to the young, well-educated and technically-trained entrepreneurs 
finding new homes for their ventures in Berlin. Even given the eventual downturn of the 
dot-com boom in Silicon Alley, the creation of social capital from entrepreneurial 
networks has been demonstrated to manage the risk incurred by individuals and 
companies. Neff believes that Silicon Alley shows how economic movements are 
inexorably linked to cultural and communication practices. The following media analysis 
of Berlin’s contemporary entrepreneurial space seeks to determine how cultural practices 
are establishing startup culture, and how such a culture is being communicated to the 
international community.  
b. Case Study Methodology: Content, Discourse, and Institutional Analyses 
 Further understanding of the contemporary entrepreneurial culture of Berlin can 
be discerned from its portrayal in popular media and international advertising. The 
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following content and discourse analyses use various media, including government-
sponsored publications, consulting reports, news articles, blog posts, and websites, to 
discern the nature of the startup scene and how it is being portrayed to both insiders and 
outsiders.10 A focus on social capital is crucial for this analysis. In his discussion of social 
capital and its uses in the creation of human capital, Coleman (1988) states, “The 
principle virtues of this intellectual stream lie in its ability to describe action in social 
context and to explain the way action is shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social 
context” (S95).  
Manski (1993) also highlights the importance of analyzing social effects under the 
guise of the “reflection problem.” The reflection problem requires one to discern whether 
the portrayed image reflects a movement or causes it. In other words, is the portrayal of 
Berlin’s startup culture reflecting the true nature of the movement, or creating a self-
fulfilling image of how entrepreneurship looks in the German capital? Furthermore, how 
is this portrayal influencing policymaking and venture capital investment flows for 
technology startups? 
 Using Dedoose, a qualitative data analytics software, a qualitative code tree was 
developed to identify trends in popular media and online discourse surrounding Berlin’s 
entrepreneurial culture and successes (See Table 13 in the data appendix for code tree).11 
Popular online media from the time period of 2011 to 2014 was collected and uploaded to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The content and discourse analyses use synthesized qualitative data from the following collection of 
popular media sources, indicated with an asterisk in the reference list: “Agora Collective: About” (2013); 
Becker et al. (2013); “Betahaus Coworking: Our Story” (2013); Bildungswerk in Kreuzberg GmbH (2011); 
Birstow (2013); Clark (2012); Economist staff (2013); Garling (2013); German Senate Department for 
Economics, Technology, and Research (2013); Global Innovation Center (2013); Ingram (2013); Kratzer 
(2013); Kulish (2011); McKinsey and Company (2013a); McKinsey and Company (2013b); Startup 
Genome (2012); Vasagar (2014);  and Williams (2013). 11	  Dedoose access was granted courtesy of the MacArthur Foundation Connected Learning Research 
Network. 
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Dedoose for analysis. Media sources include, but are not limited to: The New York Times, 
Der Spiegel, The Economist, The Financial Times, The Local, Business Traveler, and 
Wired Magazine. Eighteen sources were selected to provide a broad range of local and 
international opinion, including personal narrative, government perspective, and business 
analysis. 
 After coding the eighteen documents using the Dedoose code tree, the analysis 
features of the software were used to pool excerpts falling under the same code 
categories. A content analysis was then completed in order to determine the information 
being presented and how the entrepreneurial culture of the city has evolved in recent 
years. According to Ruiz (2009), “qualitative social research aims to obtain objective 
knowledge about subjectivity from intersubjectivity,” and he describes content analysis 
as breaking down texts into pertinent units of information for coding (3, 6). Content is 
also considered the space in which the discourse originates and acquires its meaning (9).    
Lacity and Janson (1994) discuss qualitative data analysis framework in a 
tripartite format of positivist, linguistic, and interpretive approaches. Content analysis 
falls under the categorization of positivist methodology which “impl[ies] that the 
meaning of text data is objective in the sense that a text corresponds to an objective 
reality” (142). Content analysis using thematic units requires developing a code scheme, 
coding the documents, analyzing the frequencies and natures of the codes, and 
constructing hypotheses based on these thematic units (this is the Dedoose methodology 
as described above). Such a positivist content analysis assumes that the reader can infer 
meaning from the text without direct interaction with the author or speaker. 
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 As defined by Ruiz (2009), discourse from a sociological standpoint is “any 
practice by which individuals imbue reality with meaning” (2). Analyzing discourse, 
therefore, requires researchers to reconstruct these interactions that occur through 
communication to understand their meaning, the viewpoint of those partaking in the 
discourse, and how such discourse is shaping the actual nature of events that reflect the 
habitus of the subject producing the communication.12 From the methodological 
perspective of Ruiz, discourse analysis therefore analyzes the eclectic character of 
communication that is structured around the subject, as well as the interpretation linking 
discourse with broader social realities.  
Discourse analysis is considered by Lacity and Janson to be a linguistic 
methodology, which they believe can allow researchers to “study the use of power, 
discrimination, decision processes, norms, and virtually any other social actions of 
interest” (145). Discourse analysis methodology therefore operates under the assumptions 
that language shapes reality and can be used to study behaviors. It studies the structure of 
the entire conversation surrounding an issue or institution and it “allows researchers to 
relate the sequence and organization of a dialog to the social relationships that arise from 
the conversation” (147). This methodology, alongside the interpretivist intentional 
analysis, which seeks to understand the speaker’s intentions, will build upon content 
analysis to understand how the entrepreneurial culture is being portrayed and how this 
discussion is subsequently shaping the space itself.  
 Following the analysis of media content and discourse, a basic institutional 
analysis was completed to learn more about how entrepreneurship in Berlin functions in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Habitus is adapted from Pierre Bourdieu and is defined by Ruiz (2009) as “the discursive competence of 
the subject, which derives from belonging to a given social group and from the social experience that is 
conditioned by this belonging” (13).  
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an institutional structure. In discussing institutional analysis methodology, Schneiberg 
and Clemens (2006) state: “Actors rarely, if ever, remain silent as they make policy or 
build regulatory regimes. They think, meet, argue, make claims… and generate 
discursive output…In producing this output, actors reveal how they perceive problems, 
and make connections among concepts, objects, and practices” (210-211). The authors 
comment on using the entwinement of formal institutions and cultural models to decipher 
the nature of organizational and industrial form. This process of basic institutional 
analysis was therefore used to determine policy implications of popular media narratives 
of entrepreneurship in Berlin. In doing so, the “pillars of institutionalism” in the public 
and private sphere, including regulatory, normative, and cognitive dimensions, were 
employed in the analysis (213). These three methods were all synthesized in order to 
discuss cultural, monetary, and political aspects of Berlin entrepreneurship. 
c. Content, Discourse, and Institutional Analyses 
While analyzing the content of popular media’s discussion of entrepreneurship in 
Berlin, divergence is found in the discussion of the potential of the creative and 
entrepreneurial culture in comparison to the realities of the lack of funding and 
networking opportunities. While comparing the culture of Berlin to other startup hubs, it 
is often described as “up-and-coming” and compared to New York and its dot-com boom. 
While parallels and contrasts are drawn between Berlin and Silicon Valley, most agree 
that Berlin will require another generation of entrepreneurial development before it rises 
to the level of Silicon Valley in terms of global output.  Today, Berlin’s growing startup 
scene is geographically centered around Kreuzberg, Prenzlauer Berg, and the Rosenthaler 
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Platz area of Mitte, all of which are forming the expanding “Silicon Allee” (Startup 
Genome 2012; Birstow 2013; Kulish 2011).  
This comparison discourse, particularly that which compares Berlin to New York, 
is an effective assessment of its trajectory, potential, and possible difficulties. The 
moniker of “Silicon Allee” and its comparison to New York’s nickname of the dot-com 
era cannot be disregarded in this discourse; many hope Berlin will be come another major 
German business center. Such comparisons paint Berlin as a scene with great potential, 
yet one that cannot yet match the productivity of Silicon Valley due to cultural and 
infrastructure differences. Nevertheless, constant repetition of its “up-and-coming” nature 
demonstrates that many do believe in Berlin’s startup potential. New York comparisons, 
however, also reference the startup risk described by Neff (2012), warning Berlin against 
the bubbles associated with internet and tech development and stressing diversity and 
careful planning in its startup funding and endeavors. 
In analyzing the cultural content of popular media representations, it is first 
critical to look at the references to Berlin as an artistic and cultural center of Europe, as 
well as how such artistic attitudes are developing startup culture as a whole. The tradition 
of high quality German engineering becomes important when coupled with the allure of 
Berlin as an artistic center, founded on ideals of internationalism, creativity, vibrancy, 
and multiculturalism. In fact, the governmental marketing campaign for entrepreneurial 
development in Berlin is “redefine the possible. log in. berlin.” and the city is pursuing 
active recruitment of non-German entrepreneurs who may be interested in relocating to 
the city. Its low rents and cost of living in comparison to other European cities also make 
it an affordable option for bootstrapping entrepreneurs. Ben Martinek, a Silicon Valley 
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transplant to Berlin, goes as far as to call the city “the only affordable metropolis left in 
the world” (Vasagar 2014; German Senate Department 2013; Garling 2013; Williams 
2013; Clark 2012; Bildungswerk in Kreuzberg GmbH 2011; Becker et al 2013).  
Renowned for its countercultural image that stems back to the days of partition, 
Berlin is presented as a locale in which free-spirited, creative, and ambitious individuals 
who want to “go their own way” can flourish. Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit’s famous 
characterization of Berlin as “poor, but sexy” still resonates with those who hope to 
transform their wild ideas into successful ventures while bootstrapping in Berlin. The 
eclectic scene of cafes and unique nightlife is often portrayed as a draw to the city, where 
working hours are as unpredictable as the weekend club scene. Alexander Ljung, founder 
of prominent startup Soundcloud, which relocated to Berlin from Sweden, often goes as 
far as to describe the whole city of Berlin itself as a startup, with a synthesis of artistic 
culture, technological innovation, and countercultural attitudes. Indeed, Berlin is home to 
Germany’s premier technical universities and art schools, bringing innovation culture to 
the forefront of education as well (Startup Genome 2012; Ingram 2013; Kulish 2011; 
Becker et al. 2013; Global Innovation Center 2013).  
The intersection of technology and art is particularly prominent in the startup 
culture surrounding mobile application development. In a city where the norm is 
becoming young people sitting at computers in crowded cafes, the countercultural 
attitudes of Berlin create an environment in which it is mainstream to do things 
differently. Such attitudes have given rise to Berlin-based startups such as Ljung’s audio 
streaming site Soundcloud, often described as the poster child of the Berlin 
entrepreneurial scene; Wooga, an online gaming company praised for its innovation by 
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Chancellor Angela Merkel herself; ResearchGate, a site to connect researchers, data, and 
scientists to expedite peer review processes, in which Bill Gates has become an investor; 
and 6WunderKinder, a to-do list management app that recently received an investment 
from U.S.-based Sequoia Capital (Garling 2013; Williams 2013). 
Yet others also discuss whether Berlin’s hip image can effectively create jobs. 
The “hipster” image has marketed the city as a capital of fashion, music, art, and now 
technology, with some even joking that everyone in Berlin moonlights as a DJ. As one of 
the most talked-about startup hubs in Europe, some believe Berlin’s hype is justified, 
while others are skeptical of the euphoria. Discussions of its startup culture as a “bubble” 
or “Berlin-centric”  critique the realism of its potential and may limit its options for 
future growth. Nevertheless, many argue that Berlin is on the appropriate track to 
continue benefiting from its culture and human capital as a European startup hub (Kulish 
2011; Garling 2013; Williams 2013; Becker et al. 2013; Ingram 2013). 
Cultural discourse is therefore synthesized from many critical perspectives. First, 
language often portrays Berlin as a place to “be cool,” where one is encouraged to live a 
minimalistic, hipster, anti-mainstream life in pursuit of your interests, and where one will 
be able to reap the benefits of doing so. For many, “poor but sexy” is a badge of honor 
that is associated with living in Berlin and partaking in this counterculture, and the 
discussion also highlights how this counterculture is rooted in history yet determining 
future trajectories. Affordability, high-profile transplants such as Ljung, and artistic-
technology synthesis are not just marketing techniques; rather, they are described to 
represent the true attitudes and aesthetics of the scene, which must be bought into in order 
to appreciate, understand, and succeed in this environment. In this way, the actors of the 
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scene seem to be actively solidifying these cultural ideas into institutional frameworks of 
startup culture, though perhaps they themselves would never admit to such.  
Yet it is precisely this discourse that also highlights some of the “exclusivity” and 
“hype” of the scene. Many express trepidation about the attitudes that one can only be 
successful in Berlin if they trade an office for a café, a networking event for a club, or a 
9-to-5 day for a sporadic, night-owl lifestyle. Whether or not these are actually 
necessities in Berlin is likely up to interpretation and opinion. But while the city claims to 
positively promote  relocations and development by non-German entrepreneurs, others 
bemoan the lack of immigration forms translated to English, or the lack of a formalized 
mentorship culture. Even when the discourse can be collectively described, understood, 
and used for individual benefit, there still exists a cultural disconnect in the ideas of 
openness and creativity in comparison with the actual realities that may in fact promote 
exclusivity. Despite the often-positive undertones of this discourse, it also seems to ask: 
Is a hipster counterculture sustainable for economic development in the long run? 
Additional innovation in Berlin’s entrepreneurial scene can be found in new 
technology applications and spatial components of work, such as coworking.13 McKinsey 
and Company’s report on startups in Berlin stresses the importance of digital, biomedical, 
and urban technology for the city’s success. Many argue, however, that technology has 
already become Berlin’s present and future, specifically in mobile and application 
development. Revenues from businesses are rapidly shifting from online products to 
mobile outlets, with estimates predicting that 20 percent of German productivity growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Coworking involves a shared work buildings, spaces, and infrastructure which individuals can use, often 
by becoming a member of an organization or collaborative. The same employer does usually not employ 
those working in coworking spaces, but social and collaborative motivations are also critical in the 
coworking model.  
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stems from technology such as cloud computing, e-commerce, and digital marketing. 
Government offices are quick to promote their sponsorship of tech industries in Berlin, 
but others argue that more active sponsorship of tech development is necessary to build 
support for existing strengths. The tech talent exists, and Berlin has become a main 
attraction for prominent developers, but is still waiting for its “German Google,” or an 
“exit” that will have large international significance in an online sector (McKinsey 
2013a; Kulish 2011; Williams 2013; Becker et al 2013; German Senate Department 
2013; McKinsey 2013b). 
The idea of coworking further builds on collaborative identities and shared 
infrastructure within the Berlin startup culture. With the third highest per capita number 
of coworking spaces in the world and over 50 new spaces opening up in recent years, this 
urban workspace model is actually designed to promote collaboration and networking 
while also allowing nascent entrepreneurs to keep operating costs low. The Agora 
Collective in Berlin’s Neukölln neighborhood describes itself as a “network that 
creatively facilitates the exchange, development, and encounter of the ideas, skills and 
resources amongst people and projects.” It also highlights its spacious workspaces, 
artistic studios, café, and silent zones, which can all be adapted for users with different 
needs and interests who still want to inspire and be inspired in the community.  Similarly, 
Betahaus in the Kreuzberg neighborhood was founded in a former state-owned building 
and capitalizes on its eclectic cultural mix of “Vienna-style coffee house, library, home 
office, and university campus.” Betahaus actively promotes its ideology that high quality 
value no longer originates from traditional offices or the traditional economy, but rather 
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from collaborative innovation (McKinsey and Company 2013a; German Senate 
Department 2013; “Agora Collective: About” 2013; “Betahaus: Our Story” 2013).  
Examples such as technological adaptation and coworking thus bring the 
discourse of Berlin startups in contact with the idea of the “New Economy,” a product of 
the twenty-first century which diverges from traditional economic constructs by changing 
dialogue, production, and ultimate output of economic activity. Generally, this discussion 
in Berlin is one of optimism; a history of technological prowess in engineering has long 
existed in Germany, and synthesis with creative industry engenders potential for applied 
technology. The discourse also stresses the individuality of the experience. Entrepreneurs 
are encouraged to choose their own working and networking methods to best suit their 
personalities and their ventures while striving to keep an open mind and produce output 
of quality. But do successful ventures require more structure than they are finding in 
Berlin’s culture? The discourse remains somewhat inconclusive in addressing this 
question, as Berlin is perhaps too early in its own entrepreneurial development to make 
such determinations. However, discussions of funding, networking, and scaling begin to 
show the disconnect between the positive, hyped culture of Berlin and its more humble 
realities and challenges. 
Monetization, funding, and venture capital investment are discussions of growing 
importance in the Berlin startup scene. Frankly, many believe there is not nearly enough 
venture capital or angel investment in Berlin to continue founding businesses, and it is 
seen as a major growth constraint for already-established ventures. Government 
organizations are quick to publicize public and private opportunities for funding that are 
available in Germany, but others insist that the reality finds Germany short on finance for 
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entrepreneurs. German entrepreneurs are much more likely than their international 
contemporaries to use banks or loans to fund ventures due to the lack of angel and 
venture capital investment, and this can limit creative license. Nevertheless, several 
funding bright spots do exist in Berlin, including Rocket Internet, a venture firm founded 
by the Samwer brothers that stresses resource sharing among the companies it launches. 
U.S. based firms such as Sequoia Capital and Union Square Ventures are also gaining 
interest in Berlin, causing new narratives of cautious optimism related to funding (The 
Economist Staff 2013; Garling 2013; German Senate Department 2013; Bildungswerk in 
Kreuzberg GmbH 2011; Startup Genome 2012; Vasagar 2014).  
Funding woes therefore impact the business lifecycle for startups in Berlin. It is 
estimated that a new startup is founded in Berlin every 20 hours, and many express their 
beliefs that Berlin is one of the best places in the world to start a company in the present 
day. While some hope that today’s ventures will maintain their relevance far into the 
future, others argue that Berlin is not yet mature enough in terms of capital, support 
infrastructure, and mindset. As great as Berlin may be for starting a company, resources 
are lacking for entrepreneurs as they begin to scale it. This has therefore led to high 
failure rates, low retention rates, and a short-lived startup lifecycle that often prevents 
politicians, academics, or policymakers from taking an active role in startup development 
(The Economist Staff 2013; Becker et al. 2013; Startup Genome 2012).  
The monetization and scaling discourses are somewhat difficult to decipher in 
order to understand the true nature of venture funding, as the source itself usually gives 
more information in its subtext. Government publications (German Senate Department 
2013; Bildungswerk in Kreuzberg GmbH 2011) portray an influx of foreign and domestic 
 48 
funding streaming into Berlin, but such discourse is clearly politically motivated and 
attempts to shape the space around the dialogue. This biased perspective does not 
confront the issues facing capital availability in Berlin.  The critical undertones of 
entrepreneurs themselves as they speak about government involvement raise questions as 
to whether Berlin’s models of fostering entrepreneurial growth and retention are working. 
Even if they are having successes, the discourse also demonstrates yet again the division 
between innovation culture and practicality of results. Even Berlin-based incubators such 
as Rocket Internet are often criticized in a contradictory manner, with many believing 
they create many similar ventures and do not have enough appreciation for diverse ideas 
and business models. 
This implicit dialogue therefore asks how Berlin’s attractive counterculture can be 
preserved alongside a more business-minded and results-driven atmosphere. Arguably, 
no on has exactly figured out how to do so yet. Even model startups like Soundcloud and 
Wooga have yet to record large profits. The inclusion of risk aversion into these 
discussions also shows that the optimism associated with Berlin does have practical 
concerns, both on the interior and from the exterior. Monetization and scaling therefore 
heighten this idea of “within” and “elsewhere” in the dialogue, as it describes the 
attitudes and activities within the city as well as the necessity to interact on a more 
international scale. The literature implies that the contemporary entrepreneur in Berlin 
will have to unify these two spaces and attitudes of “within” and “on the exterior” to be 
successful. 
Therefore, in the midst of such a cultural challenge, networking and synthesis of 
this process are all the more important for the proliferation of successful business models. 
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Despite the discourse of collaboration in coworking spaces and cafes such as St. 
Oberholz in Rosenthaler Platz, there is concern that the Berlin startup community is not 
networked enough. While clustering usually occurs around ventures with similar 
technology, methods, and missions, stakeholders are portrayed as distant from established 
companies and some aspects of government and policy. The transience of the city is also 
a difficulty for trying to establish supportive and deep-rooted networks (Kulish 2011; 
McKinsey 2013b; Ingram 2013). 
d. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 Having analyzed the content and discourse of popular media surrounding 
entrepreneurial culture in Berlin and discerned what the discourse demonstrates about the 
institutions that comprise the startup culture, it therefore becomes critical to evaluate 
policy implications and suggestions put forth in this literature. This will evaluate how 
entrepreneurship in Berlin can be actively supported and expanded. Many express 
optimism that multibillion-euro companies are in Germany’s not-so-distant future, and 
that the companies being founded today will continue to have relevance in the coming 
years. But the discourse of popular media makes it clear that certain structures and 
attitudes of Berlin startups will need to be addressed before this can become a realistic 
and sustainable goal, and strategies need to be approached proactively to continue 
encouraging local and non-German entrepreneurs alike to buy into Berlin’s startup 
culture (Becker et al. 2013). 
Angela Merkel and her coalition government have also vowed their support to create 
a new Gründerzeit, or Era of Founders, in Germany through their support for 
infrastructure, research, and education. Yet the way in which such programs are instituted 
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will be critical in determining their success. The German Senate Department for 
Economics, Technology, and Research lauds itself as “Berlin’s one-stop agency for 
domestic and foreign companies,” but many who are active in Berlin’s entrepreneurial 
scene criticize the city and national governments’ involvement.  Government agencies 
often lack English-speaking or multilingual staff, translated documents, and 
understandable bureaucracy, making it harder for Berlin to grow on an international scale 
(Vasagar 2014; German Senate Department 2013). 
 Global consulting firm McKinsey and Company recommends the development of a 
multilingual unit of roughly 10 directors and additional employees to outline and 
implement strategies and goals for entrepreneurs in Berlin and to act as a liaison between 
the government and startups themselves. Others describe the necessity of expanding loans 
for new businesses from KfW, the federal development bank, and High-Tech 
Gründerfonds, a semi-official state venture capital firm. Therefore, in order to foster 
entrepreneurial development, government activities must become better-coordinated and 
more accessible, while remaining cognizant of the unique culture that originally created 
Berlin’s startup mentality (McKinsey and Company 2013a, 2013b; The Economist Staff 
2013).  
Perhaps an effective method of working toward such a cultural and governmental 
synthesis would be to reach out and form partnerships with successful entrepreneurs to 
promote venture capital investing and entrepreneurial recruitment in the city. The Global 
Innovation Center critiques Germany’s risk attitudes, pointing out that top engineering 
talent is usually funneled to established manufacturers and the “culture of failure” 
necessary for entrepreneurial persistence is generally lacking. Because Berlin still lacks 
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major IPOs, entrepreneurs often turn to the large incubators managed by German 
companies, such as Deutsche Telekom or Rewe. Such funding practices thus perpetuate 
the established business culture of in Germany and do not allow for enough opportunities 
to innovate (Global Innovation Center 2013; The Economist Staff 2013). 
Berlin is not Silicon Valley, and attempts to morph it into a copied structure will 
likely not be successful. However, it is often remarked that Silicon Valley startups are 
encouraged to get users first and make money later, an attitude very divergent from that 
of Berlin. Perhaps ideological convergence could therefore be found if actual members of 
both Berlin’s and other cities’ startup scenes take on the role of venture capitalists, angel 
investors, incubators, or policymakers. Firms need continued resources to discuss and 
plan long-term financing. Expanded foreign investment will be critical to future scaling 
and development, yet government and private firms will also benefit from recruiting 
successful Berlin entrepreneurs such as Alex Ljung of Soundcloud or Jens Begemann of 
Wooga to advise growth strategies for venture capital in the city. As founders who have 
navigated funding, regulations, and culture to create ventures in the city, they are 
luminaries who can assist with synthesizing funding and networking in Berlin (Garling 
2013; McKinsey 2013a; The Economist Staff 2013). 
Finally, Berlin must continue its investment and promotion of entrepreneurship in 
education, training, and networking. Education must continue to innovate and accept its 
challenge of changing societal perceptions of entrepreneurship, encouraging students and 
graduates to pursue their own business ventures. Entrepreneurial education is gaining 
momentum in German and European universities, and it is starting to be recognized as a 
legitimate academic discipline. But it is still largely considered a grassroots movement. 
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More needs to be done to encourage professors and students to pursue IT-based courses 
and entrepreneurial employment, and incentives can stimulate more activity at research 
institutes. Using education to construct this social capital and habitus of entrepreneurship 
will have long-term effects on innovation and networking (Kratzer 2013; McKinsey 
2013b). 
Education must also continue outside of the confines of a university. McKinsey and 
Company also advocates for a “Berlin Startup Curriculum” as a way of connecting 
entrepreneurs with resources and networking while aligning policy and funding activities. 
They also suggest the former Tempelhof Airport in western Berlin as a possible site for a 
startup campus. Such a project would provide training and networking spaces for nascent 
entrepreneurs, and established companies could also build headquarters on the property. 
In the socio-spatial sense, it would create a centralized enclave of startup activity in the 
city, thus creating a small and concentrated Silicon Allee where training and networking 
were more accessible and encouraged. Plans are already in the works to build a 230-
hectare research hub for energy and biotechnology at the site of Tegel Airport, but the 
continued delays to its replacement Berlin Brandenburg Airport have also caused 
unexpected delays to this project. These projects can use the precedent of Google’s The 
Factory in Berlin Mitte, which serves as a locale to bring tech entrepreneurs together 
(McKinsey and Company 2013b; Clark 2012; Garling 2013). 
Overall, policy strategies for fostering entrepreneurial growth in Berlin are often 
dependent on the contrasts between that which is “within” the city and that which will 
come from “elsewhere.” Successful policies, however, must acknowledge the existence 
of both of these spaces. From within, Berlin must continue to leverage its technical and 
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engineering talent, while using education and training to encourage skilled Germans to 
look towards more non-traditional paths of business and career development. 
Government organizations can also do more to collaborate with already-established 
entrepreneurs and incubators, as this will allow for development that remains mindful of 
Berlin’s entrepreneurial culture and also synthesizes proven methods for success. Finding 
the tenuous balance of hip and free-spirited culture alongside proven business plans will 
not be an easy task, meaning that policymakers and funders must leverage the resources 
provided by key innovators who have already impacted the scene greatly. 
While Berlin’s startup culture cannot be constructed around international models that 
do not account for its own history and culture, there are still lessons to be learned from 
successes and failures of hubs such as Silicon Valley, London, and New York’s Silicon 
Alley. Coworking and “café culture” models have been successful for networking 
relationships, but Berlin must now discern how to begin infusing some of the “culture of 
failure” that acknowledges failure potential but accepts it as a necessity for innovation 
and creativity. A reliance on foreign investment may not be sustainable for Berlin in the 
long-run, but its nascent scene will definitely benefit from large-scale foreign investors as 
it seeks to increase its global presence and produce larger company exits and IPOs. By 
making the city more welcoming to non-German entrepreneurs, it can hope to generate a 
new “hype” that is more sustainable and founded in results. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent German 
Reunification in 1990, a series of economic and social shifts comprised Germany’s 
 54 
history throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The merging of capitalist and socialist 
economic systems, coupled with the increasing globalization of the international 
economy, subsequently brought changes in labor market decisions and participation for 
many Germans. Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, as well as popular 
media literature, this paper analyzes self-employment trends and the effects of social 
capital from 1986 to 2014 using economic regression analysis and sociological content 
and discourse analyses. 
 Regression analysis conducted using six waves of the G-SOEP data set showed 
several interesting trends in regards to predictors of entrepreneurship. Self-employment 
variables were used as proxies for entrepreneurship in probit regressions, and each year’s 
models provided evidence that those who are self-employed are on average more likely to 
be older, male, German-born, and highly educated or trained. For most of the waves of 
regression analysis, those who were self-employed in their first job were highly likely to 
be self-employed at the time of the survey, but this trend has become less pronounced 
over time, perhaps indicating a changing profile of a German entrepreneur. 
 Political affiliations appear to provide significant social capital for self-employed 
individuals, and levels of political interest have become even more important for 
entrepreneurs in recent years. Additionally, high work satisfaction and willingness to take 
risks, as well as ability to control decision-making and on-the-job learning, are strong and 
significant indicators of self-employment. Higher household income on average indicates 
that one is more likely to be self-employed, though this trend has reversed in recent years 
for wages. Additionally, regressions run for the immigrant subsamples of the G-SOEP 
show that those with strong command of the German language have higher 
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entrepreneurial propensity, and those who wish to remain in Germany permanently are 
less likely to choose self-employment as a labor market option. Opportunities for future 
research using this data set and these regression models are numerous. Many measures of 
social capital (i.e. sense of membership in the local community, living standards, 
relationships with relatives) were not significant in this sample. Expanding the survey 
population or developing new models for contemporary data could help show how such 
aspects of social capital are affecting modern entrepreneurial decisions.    
 The sociological analysis of popular media highlights the contrasts between the 
successes of entrepreneurial culture in contemporary Berlin and the realities of funding 
and networking difficulties in its current entrepreneurial environment. Its countercultural 
image, combined with adaptation of technology within its startup industries, makes it 
attractive for young entrepreneurs who want to take advantage of this alternative lifestyle. 
But this subculture of Berlin also has negative implications of exclusivity, and 
government policy does not appear to be encouraging venture capital investment or 
mentorship, or to be inspiring international entrepreneurs to relocate. Future policies 
regarding entrepreneurship in Berlin will therefore need to reconcile the culture within 
the city with the economic and international forces outside of it in order to develop 
sustainable and productive models of entrepreneurship. 
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Table 1: Self-Employment in 1986 
 
Self-Employed in 1986 Frequency Percentage 
        No 9,615 95.68 
        Yes 434 4.32 
        Total 10,049 100.00 
 
 
Table 2: Self-Employment in 1991 
Self-Employed in 1991 Frequency Percentage 
        No 12,376 95.95 
        Yes 523 4.05 
        Total 12,899 100.00 
 
 
Table 3: Self-Employment in 1996 
Self-Employed in 1996 Frequency Percentage 
        No 12,153 95.39 
        Yes 587 4.61 
        Total 12,740 100.00 
 
 
Table 4: Self-Employment in 2001 
Self-Employed in 1986 Frequency Percentage 
        No 20,056 94.85 
        Yes 1,090 5.15 
        Total 21,146 100.00 
 
 
Table 5: Self-Employment in 2006 
Self-Employed in 1986 Frequency Percentage 
        No 19,835 93.74 
        Yes 1,325 6.26 
        Total 21,160 100.00 
 
Table 6: Self-Employment in 2011 
Self-Employed in 1986 Frequency Percentage 
        No 18,860 94.30 
        Yes 1,141 5.70 
        Total 20,001 100.00 
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Table 7: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 1986 
Self-Employed 
1986 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Social Income Immigrant 
Age in 1986 0.0007 0.0021 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0010 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)* (0.0002)*** 
Gender        
     Female -0.0156 -0.0002 -0.0163 -0.0212 0.0014 0.0029 
 (0.0041)*** (0.0071) (0.0063)** (0.0060)*** (0.0037) (0.0076) 
Nationality       
     Born in  
     Germany 0.0084 0.0140 -0.0048 -0.0074 -0.0028 -0.0195 
 (0.0048)* (0.0078)* (0.0105) (0.0154) (0.0041) (0.0126) 
Amount of 
Education or 
Training in 
Years 
0.0070 0.0095 0.0057 0.0055 0.0013 0.0051 
 (0.0008)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0007)* (0.0018)*** 
Age at First Job  -0.0019     
       (0.0012)*     
First Job Self-
Employed     0.4208     
  (0.0470)***     
Number of Job 
Changes       
      One   0.0108     
  (0.0081)     
     Two or More  0.0078     
  (0.0092)     
Work 
Satisfaction       
     Somewhat  0.0258     
   (0.0283)     
     Moderately  0.0183     
  (0.0258)     
     Very  0.0203     
  (0.0256)     
Unemployed in 
Previous Year  -0.0156     
  (0.0155)     
Political 
Interests       
     Weak   -0.0020    
    (0.0126)    
     Strong   0.0084    
     (0.0137)    
     Very Strong   0.0149    
   (0.0172)    
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Self-Employed 
1986 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Social Income Immigrant 
Political Party 
Supported 
(SPD=Base) 
      
     CDU/CSU   0.0713    
   (0.0070)***    
     FDP   0.0717    
   (0.0219)***    
     Green   0.0243    
   (0.0114)**    
     Other   0.0144    
   (0.0313)    
Amount of 
Support for 
Political Party 
      
     Fairly Weak   -0.0280    
   (0.0331)    
     Moderate   -0.0236    
   (0.0306)    
     Fairly Strong   -0.0200    
   (0.0309)    
     Very Strong   -0.0245    
   (0.0316)    
Highest School 
Degree Received 
by Father 
(Secondary= 
Base Case) 
      
   Intermediate    -0.0075   
      (0.0098)   
  Upper 
Secondary    -0.0046   
    (0.0115)   
   Other    0.0209   
    (0.0403)   
Highest School 
Degree Received 
by Mother 
(Secondary=Bas
e Case) 
      
   Intermediate    0.0515   
    (0.0155)***   
   Upper 
Secondary    0.0361   
    (0.0232)   
   Other    0.0206   
    (0.0450)   
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Self-Employed 
in 1986 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Social Income Immigrant 
Wages in 1986     0.0024  
     (0.0020)  
Household Post-
Government 
Income 1986 
    0.0004  
     (0.0001)***  
Household 
Income from 
Asset Flows 
1986 
    0.0005  
     (0.0002)**  
Individual 
Labor Earnings 
1986 
    -0.0004  
     (0.0003)  
Sense of 
German 
Nationality 
      
     Do Not Feel  
     Very German      0.0095 
      (0.0104) 
     Feel Partly  
     German      0.0129 
      (0.0088) 
     Feel Mostly   
     German      0.0054 
      (0.0149) 
     Feel Fully  
     German      0.0179 
      (0.0235) 
German 
Language Skills       
     Fair      0.0110 
        (0.0073) 
     Good      0.0265 
      (0.0093)*** 
     Very Good      0.0531 
      (0.0189)*** 
Observations 9882 5320 4904 5801 5436 2232 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 1991  
Self-Employed 
in 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base 
Case 
Employ. Politics Parents Relatives Standards Friends Income Immigrant 
Age in 1991 0.0006 0.0024 0.0004 0.0018 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0001 0.0007 
 (0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0004) 
*** 
(0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0003) 
*** 
(0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0001) 
*** 
(0.0003) 
*** 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
*** 
Gender          
   Female -0.0208 -0.0027 -0.0228 -0.0338 -0.0269 -0.0210 -0.0406 -0.0063 -0.0137 
 (0.0035) 
*** 
(0.0078) (0.0077) 
*** 
(0.0067) 
*** 
(0.0060) 
*** 
(0.0040) 
*** 
(0.0096) 
*** 
(0.0025) 
** 
(0.0071)* 
Nationality          
   Born in  
   Germany 
0.0059 0.0211 0.0141   0.0120  -0.0035 -0.0151 
 (0.0046) (0.0087) 
** 
(0.0169)   (0.0093)  (0.0033) (0.0111) 
Amount of 
Education in 
Years 
0.0051 0.0072 0.0048 0.0042 0.0030 0.0055 0.0030 0.0011 0.0043 
 (0.0007) 
*** 
(0.0018) 
*** 
(0.0015) 
*** 
(0.0012) 
*** 
(0.0012)** (0.0008)*** (0.0019) (0.0005) 
** 
(0.0019)** 
Age at First 
Job 
 -0.0010        
  (0.0013)        
Self Employed 
First Job 
 0.3356        
  (0.0556) 
*** 
       
Number of 
Job Changes 
         
   One  0.0054        
     (0.0092)        
   Two or More  -0.0038        
  (0.0103)        
Work 
Satisfaction 
         
   Somewhat  -0.0006        
  (0.0465)        
   Moderately  -0.0135        
  (0.0449)        
   Very  0.0061        
  (0.0449)        
Unemployed 
Previous Year 
 0.0037        
  (0.0246)        
Political 
Interests 
         
   Strong   0.0065       
   (0.0089)       
   Very Strong   0.0022       
   (0.0127)       
 71 
Self-Employed 
in 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base 
Case 
Employ. Politics Parents Relatives Standards Friends Income Immigrant 
Political Party 
Supported 
(SDP=Base 
Case) 
         
   CDU/CSU   0.0413       
   (0.0078) 
*** 
      
   FDP   0.0990       
   (0.0243) 
*** 
      
   Greens   0.0124       
   (0.0151)       
Amount of 
Support for 
Polit. Party 
         
   Fairly Weak   0.0170       
   (0.0425)       
   Moderate   0.0108       
   (0.0383)       
   Fairly Strong   0.0073       
   (0.0384)       
   Very Strong   0.0030       
   (0.0400)       
Nature of 
Relationship 
with Mother 
         
   Average    0.0173      
    (0.0331)      
   Close    0.0108      
    (0.0330)      
   Very Close    -0.0262      
    (0.0329)      
Nature of 
Relationship 
with Father 
         
   Average    -0.0352      
    (0.0269)      
   Close     -0.0284      
    (0.0283)      
   Very Close    0.0088      
    (0.0341)      
Have 
Relatives in 
Another Part 
of Germany 
     
-0.0054 
    
     (0.0149)     
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Self-Employed 
in 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base 
Case 
Employ. Politics Parents Relatives Standards Friends Income Immigrant 
Relationship 
with Relatives 
         
   Fleeting     0.0040     
     (0.0135)     
   Average     0.0317     
     (0.0151) 
** 
    
   Close     -0.0066     
     (0.0113)     
   Very Close     0.0140     
     (0.0162)     
Know Persons 
who Moved to 
West 
         
   Yes, Close  
   Relations 
    -0.0157  -0.0199   
     (0.0081)*  (0.0131)   
   Yes, Good  
   Friends 
    0.0186  0.0123   
     (0.0130)  (0.0160)   
   Yes,   
   Coworkers 
    -0.0257  -0.0346   
     (0.0080) 
*** 
 (0.0128) 
*** 
  
Regional 
Standard of 
Living 
         
   Moderate      -0.0015    
      (0.0123)    
   Good      0.0083    
      (0.0124)    
   Very Good       0.0187    
      (0.0131)    
Standard of 
Living in Old 
FRG 
         
   Moderate      -0.0078    
      (0.0426)    
   Good      -0.0194    
      (0.0421)    
  Very Good      -0.0253    
      (0.0421)    
Standard of 
Living in Old 
GDR 
         
   Moderate      0.0032    
      (0.0052)    
   Good      0.0029    
      (0.0072)    
   Very Good      -0.0015    
      (0.0182)    	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Self-Employed 
in 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base 
Case 
Employ. Politics Parents Relatives Standards Friends Income Immigrant 
Sense of Local 
Community 
         
   Not Much      -0.0196    
      (0.0152)    
   Strong      -0.0197    
      (0.0147)    
   Very Strong      -0.0140    
Intentions of 
Moving within 
Germany 
     (0.0151)    
   Already  
   Moved 
     -0.0022    
      (0.0386)    
   Probably Not      -0.0087    
      (0.0054)    
   Yes,  
   Depending  
   on Situation 
      
-0.0033 
   
      (0.0055)    
   Yes, Very  
   Much 
     -0.0138    
      (0.0132)    
Relationship 
with Friends 
         
   Average       0.0302   
       (0.0108) 
*** 
  
   Close       0.0311   
       (0.0137) 
** 
  
   Very Close       0.0291   
       (0.0218)   
Wages in 1991        -0.0013  
        (0.0018)  
Household 
Post-Govt. 
Income 1991 
        
0.0002 
 
        (0.0001)*  
Household 
Income Asset 
Flows 1991 
        
0.0003 
 
        (0.0002)*  
Individual 
Labor 
Earnings 1991 
        
0.0000 
 
        (0.0002)  	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Self-Employed 
in 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base 
Case 
Employ. Politics Parents Relatives Standards Friends Income Immigrant 
Sense of 
German 
Nationality 
         
   Do not feel  
   Very German 
        -0.0060 
         (0.0109) 
   Feel Partly   
   German 
        -0.0031 
         (0.0098) 
   Feel Mostly  
   German 
        -0.0165 
         (0.0114) 
   Feel Very  
   German 
        -0.0029 
German 
Language 
Skills 
        (0.0198) 
   Fair         0.0017 
         (0.0078) 
   Good         0.0234 
         (0.0099)** 
   Very Good          0.0411 
         (0.0163)** 
Observations 12707 4368 3469 3894 3867 10308 2012 5046 2043 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 1996 
Self-Employed in 
1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Social Income 
Age in 1996 0.0006 0.0017 -0.0000 0.0025 0.0006 0.0002 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0001) (0.0004)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001) 
Gender       
     Female -0.0294 -0.0283 -0.0314 -0.0321 -0.0324 -0.0067 
 (0.0037)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)** 
Nationality       
     Born in  
     Germany 
0.0147 0.0277 0.0247 0.0114 0.0196 -0.0016 
 (0.0044)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0084) (0.0042)*** (0.0040) 
Amount of 
Education or 
Training in 
Years 
 
0.0062 
 
0.0074 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0052 
  
 (0.0007)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0013)***   
Age at First Job  0.0001     
  (0.0013)     
Self-Employed 
First Job 
 0.2409     
  (0.0508)***     
Number of Job 
Changes 
      
   One  0.0046     
  (0.0079)     
   Two or More  0.0128     
  (0.0097)     
Work 
Satisfaction 
      
   Somewhat  0.0263     
  (0.0199)     
   Moderately  0.0306     
  (0.0180)*     
   Very  0.0375     
  (0.0180)**     
Unemployed in 
Previous Year 
 -0.0145     
  (0.0125)     
Political 
Interests 
      
   Strong   0.0195    
   (0.0079)**    
   Very Strong   0.0281    
   (0.0146)*    	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Self-Employed in 
1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Social Income 
Political Party 
Supported 
(SDP=Base Case) 
      
     CDU/CSU   0.0396    
   (0.0075)***    
     FDP   0.1335    
   (0.0362)***    
     Alliance/Green   0.0407    
   (0.0125)***    
     PDS   0.0124    
   (0.0139)    
     Republican   0.0411    
   (0.0337)    
     Other   0.0034    
   (0.0298)    
Amount of 
Support for 
Political Party 
      
     Fairly Weak   0.0098    
   (0.0351)    
     Moderate   0.0055    
   (0.0312)    
     Fairly Strong   0.0056    
   (0.0315)    
     Very Strong   0.0222    
   (0.0347)    
Nature of 
Relationship 
with Mother 
      
     Average    -0.0498   
    (0.0504)   
     Close    -0.0819   
    (0.0512)   
     Very Close    -0.0678   
    (0.0524)   
Nature of 
Relationship 
with Father 
      
     Average    -0.0069   
    (0.0221)   
     Close    0.0166   
    (0.0239)   
     Very Close    -0.0029   
    (0.0243)   
Sense of Local 
Community 
      
     Not much     -0.0032  
     (0.0113)  
     Strong     -0.0061  
     (0.0109)  
     Very Strong     0.0018  
     (0.0114)  
 77 
Self-Employed in 
1996 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Social Income 
Intentions of 
Moving within 
Germany 
      
     Probably Not     -0.0023  
     (0.0050)  
     Yes,  
     Depending on       
     the Situation 
     
0.0056 
 
     (0.0052)  
     Yes, Very  
     Much 
    0.0065  
     (0.0135)  
Wages in 1996      0.0016 
      (0.0018) 
Household Post-
Govt. Income in 
1996 
     0.0003 
      (0.0001)*** 
Household 
Income from 
Asset Flows 1996 
     -0.0001 
      (0.0001) 
Individual Labor 
Earnings 1996 
     -0.0004 
      (0.0003) 
Observations 12409 6136 4653 4306 12285 7106 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 2001 
Self-Employed in 
2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Income Immigrant 
Age in 2001 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0028 0.0001 0.0006 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0005)* (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0001)** (0.0004)* 
Gender       
     Female -0.0332 -0.0219 -0.0253 -0.0457 -0.0043 -0.0268 
 (0.0031)*** (0.0089)** (0.0055)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0021)** (0.0160)* 
Nationality       
     Born in  
     Germany 
0.0141 0.0147 0.0247 0.0109 0.0041 -0.0075 
 (0.0043)*** (0.0134) (0.0080)*** (0.0091) (0.0022)* (0.0279) 
Amount of 
Education or 
Training in Years 
 
0.0067 
 
0.0024 
 
0.0048 
 
0.0083 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0027 
 (0.0006)*** (0.0021) (0.0010)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0032) 
Age at First Job  0.0045     
  (0.0018)**     
First Job Self-
Employed 
 0.0920     
  (0.0514)*     
Job Changes  -0.0103     
     (0.0093)     
Age at Most 
Recent 
Occupational 
Change 
  
0.0012 
    
  (0.0006)*     
Work Satisfaction       
     Somewhat  0.0150     
  (0.0494)     
     Moderately  0.0082     
  (0.0473)     
     Very  -0.0087     
  (0.0472)     
Unemployed in 
Previous Year 
 0.0123     
  (0.0196)     
You Can Decide 
How to Complete 
Tasks at Work 
      
     Applies  
     Partially 
 0.0413     
  (0.0066)***     
     Applies 
     Completely 
 0.1747     
  (0.0105)***     	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Self-Employed in 
2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Income Immigrant 
You Often Learn 
Something New at 
Work 
      
     Applies 
     Partially 
 0.0150     
  (0.0119)     
     Applies 
     Completely 
 0.0473     
  (0.0130)***     
Received 
Education or 
Training on the 
Job in 2000 
  
-0.0190 
    
  (0.0229)     
Political Interests       
     Strong   0.0096    
   (0.0060)    
     Very Strong   0.0353    
   (0.0107)***    
Political Party 
Supported (SDP= 
Base Case) 
      
     CDU/CSU   0.0568    
   (0.0061)***    
     FDP   0.1343    
   (0.0222)***    
     Alliance/ Green   0.0272    
   (0.0093)***    
     PDS   0.0187    
   (0.0119)    
     Republican   0.0454    
   (0.0311)    
     Other   0.0125    
   (0.0257)    
Amount of 
Support for 
Political Party 
      
     Fairly Weak   -0.0007    
   (0.0373)    
     Moderate   -0.0227    
   (0.0345)    
     Fairly Strong   -0.0206    
   (0.0347)    
     Very Strong   -0.0273    
   (0.0358)    	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Self-Employed in 
2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Parents Income Immigrant 
Nature of 
Relationship with 
Mother 
      
     Average    0.0325   
         (0.0220)   
     Close    0.0380   
    (0.0217)*   
     Very Close    0.0137   
    (0.0217)   
Nature of 
Relationship with 
Father 
      
     Average    -0.0148   
    (0.0236)   
     Close    -0.0346   
    (0.0236)   
     Very Close    0.0075   
    (0.0260)   
Wages in 2001     -0.0029  
     (0.0010)***  
Household Post-
Government 
Income in 2001 
     
0.0002 
 
     (0.0001)***  
Household 
Income from 
Asset Flows 2001 
     
-0.0001 
 
     (0.0001)  
Individual Labor 
Earnings 2001 
    0.0000  
     (0.0001)  
German 
Language Skills 
      
     Fair      0.0045 
      (0.0186) 
     Good      0.0321 
      (0.0216) 
     Very Good      0.0556 
      (0.0281)** 
Wish to Remain 
in Germany 
     0.0165 
      (0.0307) 
Observations 20127 4280 7877 6298 10316 609 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 2006 
Self-Employed in 
2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Income Immigrant 
Age in 2006 -0.0000 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0003)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Gender      
     Female -0.0369 -0.0378 -0.0450 -0.0036 -0.0396 
 (0.0034)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0022)* (0.0093)*** 
Nationality      
     Born in  
     Germany 
0.0148 0.0336 0.0017 0.0042 0.0124 
 (0.0052)*** (0.0102)*** (0.0111) (0.0025)* (0.0130) 
Amount of 
Education or 
Training in Years 
 
0.0089 
 
0.0112 
 
0.0074 
  
0.0109 
 (0.0006)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0010)***  (0.0017)*** 
Age at First Job  0.0007    
  (0.0013)    
First Job Self-
Employed 
 0.2563    
  (0.0398)***    
Number of Job 
Changes 
     
     One  0.0121    
  (0.0080)    
     Two or More  0.0067    
  (0.0094)    
Work Satisfaction      
     Somewhat  0.0441    
  (0.0198)**    
     Moderately  0.0430    
  (0.0177)**    
     Very  0.0525    
  (0.0177)***    
Unemployed in 
Previous Year 
 0.0004    
  (0.0139)    
Willingness to 
Take Risks 
     
      Moderate  0.0041    
  (0.0139)    
     High  0.0358    
  (0.0137)***    
     Very High  0.1294    
  (0.0175)***    
Job Education or 
Training  
 0.0323    
  (0.0281)    	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Self-Employed in 
2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Income Immigrant 
Political Interests      
     Strong   0.0132   
   (0.0065)**   
     Very Strong   0.0187   
   (0.0094)**   
Political Party 
Supported (SDP= 
Base Case) 
     
     CDU/CSU   0.0461   
   (0.0060)***   
     FDP   0.1136   
   (0.0168)***   
     Alliance/Green   0.0608   
   (0.0107)***   
     PDS   -0.0039   
   (0.0094)   
     Republican   -0.0359   
   (0.0128)***   
     Other   0.0289   
   (0.0297)   
Amount of 
Support for 
Political Party 
     
     Fairly Weak   -0.0188   
   (0.0360)   
     Moderate   0.0031   
   (0.0339)   
     Fairly Strong   0.0024   
   (0.0340)   
     Very Strong   0.0144   
   (0.0355)   
Wages in 2006    -0.0027  
    (0.0011)**  
Household Post-
Government 
Income 2006 
   0.0001  
    (0.0000)***  
Household 
Income from 
Asset Flows 2006 
   -0.0001  
    (0.0001)**  
Individual Labor 
Earnings 2006 
   0.0000  
    (0.0001)  
Wish to Remain 
in Germany 
Permanently 
    -0.0022 
     (0.0104) 
Observations 19935 8180 9089 9982 2090 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12: Regression Models: Self-Employment in 2011 
Self-Employed in 
2011 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Social Income Immigrant 
Age in 2011 -0.0003 0.0025 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0002) 
Gender       
     Female -0.0301 -0.0258 -0.0280 -0.0298 -0.0298 -0.0223 
 (0.0034)*** (0.0110)** (0.0057)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0108)** 
Nationality       
     Born in Germany 0.0045 0.0281 -0.0047 0.0045 0.0045 -0.0128 
 (0.0057) (0.0167)* (0.0119) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0135) 
Amount of 
Education or 
Training in Years 
 
0.0087 
 
0.0118 
 
0.0072 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0086 
 
0.0085 
 (0.0006)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0020)*** 
Age at First Job  0.0021     
  (0.0021)     
First Job Self-
Employed 
 0.0806     
  (0.0492)     
Job Changes  -0.0040     
  (0.0115)     
Age at Most Recent 
Job Change 
 0.0012     
  (0.0008)     
Work Satisfaction       
     Somewhat  0.0830     
  (0.0207)***     
     Moderately  0.0771     
  (0.0154)***     
     Very  0.1235     
  (0.0156)***     
Unemployed in 
Previous Year 
 -0.0393     
  (0.0199)**     
Willingness to 
Take Risks 
      
     Moderate  -0.0230     
  (0.0229)     
     High  0.0202     
  (0.0229)     
     Very High  0.0815     
  (0.0295)***     
Received 
Education or 
Retraining on the 
Job 2011 
  
-0.0416 
    
  (0.0389)     	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Self-Employed in 
2011 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base Case Employment Politics Social Income Immigrant 
Political Interests       
     Strong   0.0150    
   (0.0064)**    
     Very Strong    0.0330    
   (0.0098)***    
Political Party 
Supported 
(SDP=Base Case) 
      
     CDU/CSU   0.0334    
   (0.0065)***    
     FDP   0.1034    
   (0.0203)***    
     Alliance/Greens   0.0234    
   (0.0078)***    
     PDS   0.0150    
   (0.0112)    
     Republicans   0.0173    
   (0.0274)    
     Other   0.0101    
   (0.0254)    
Amount of Support 
for Political Party  
      
     Fairly Weak   0.0211    
   (0.0445)    
     Moderate   -0.0231    
   (0.0411)    
     Fairly Strong   -0.0232    
   (0.0412)    
     Strong   0.0033    
   (0.0426)    
Number of Close 
Friends 
   0.0006   
    (0.0002)***   
Wages in 2011     -0.0017  
     (0.0007)***  
Wish to Remain in 
Germany 
Permanently 
     -0.0343 
      (0.0154)** 
Observations 19024 3327 7906 18586 9037 1649 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 13: Sociological Code Tree for Dedoose Analysis 
 
I. Artistic and Cultural 
a. Counterculture 
i. “Hipster” 
ii. “Bubble” 
iii. “Hype” 
b. Startup Culture 
i. Networking 
1. Key Innovators 
2. Mentorship 
ii. Coworking 
iii. Specific Startups 
iv. Risk Aversion 
v. Training 
c. Comparison Cities 
II. German Regard 
a. Geography 
b. Government Involvement 
c. Cost of Living 
III. International Regard 
a. Non-German Entrepreneurs 
b. Future Optimism 
c. Future Pessimism 
i. Reservations 
IV. Foster Growth 
a. Business Lifecycle 
i. Futuristic-looking 
ii. Retention of startups 
iii. Market Sizing 
iv. New Economy 
b. Education 
i. University Sponsorship 
c. Monetization and Funding 
i. Venture Capital 
d. Technology Adoption 
i. Technology Talent 
